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The first two roles of the U.S. Attorney General from its 
inception were to represent the interests of the United States before 
the U.S. Supreme Court and to advise the President on matters of the 
law.  Despite the Attorney General delegating both roles, the former 
to the Solicitor General and the latter to the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC), the Attorney General and the Department of Justice are by 
statute and tradition looked upon to be the protectors of the rule of 
law within the Executive Branch.  It is to the Attorney General, and 
by delegation to the OLC, to say to the strong seas of presidential 
power, this far and no farther will you come and here your proud 
waves must stop!  The role of the OLC to provide dispositive opinions 
on the meaning of the law and to protect the rule of law requires that 
the OLC provide a specific type of advice that separates it from other 
types of legal advice from other quarters within the Executive 
Branch. After September 11th, the Bush Administration’s OLC 
abandoned the Neutral Expositor of the best view of the law model 
and advanced a Private Lawyer model to advising the President.  
This article reviews the literature on the proper role of the OLC 
within the Executive Branch and places the torture memos within a 
broader context of the OLC’s failure to maintain its proper role of a 
quasi-judicial advisor on the meaning of law. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Under the Constitution, the President is required to faithfully 
execute the law, is authorized to seek advice from his department 
heads when making policy, and is the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army and Navy.
1
  After the events of September 11, 2001, President 
Bush sought the advice of the Department of Justice Office of Legal 
                                                          
* Arthur H. Garrison is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at 
Kutztown University in Kutztown, PA.  Dr. Garrison received a B.S. from 
Kutztown University, a M.S. from West Chester University, and a Doctor of Law 
and Policy from Northeastern University.  Dr. Garrison is author of SUPREME 
COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS, TERRORISM, AND WAR: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2011). 
1 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; and U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
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Counsel (OLC) for a binding legal opinion
2
 on presidential authority 
to respond to the attacks of al Qaeda and its supporters.
3
  It has been 
eleven years since the OLC issued a set of opinions that authorized 
the President to order enhanced interrogation techniques of captured 
enemy combatants as a result of the military actions in Afghanistan 
and later in Iraq.  On August 1, 2002, the OLC issued two opinions 
regarding the President’s power to designate captured individuals as 
enemy combatants and how they could be interrogated for 
information helpful in the war on terror.  The first memo, 
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President Re: 
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340A [hereinafter August 2002 Memo],
4
 asserted that a set of 
proposed interrogation techniques were not a violation of federal law 
prohibiting torture
5
 and international law.
6
  The second memo, 
Memorandum for John Rizzo Acting General Counsel of Central 
Intelligence Agency Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative, August 
1, 2002 [hereinafter CIA Interrogation Memo],
7
 asserted that a list of 
ten specific techniques
8
 used on specific captured terrorists did not 
                                                          
2 See Arthur H. Garrison, The Opinions by the Attorney General and The 
Office of Legal Counsel: The How and Why They are Significant, 76 ALB. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (discussing the historical development of the quasi-judicial 
authority of the Attorney General and later the OLC to issue binding opinions on 
the meaning of the law within the Executive Branch). 
3 Arthur H. Garrison, The Office of Legal Counsel “Torture Memos”: A 
Content Analysis of What the OLC Got Right and What They Got Wrong, 49 CRIM. 
L. BULL. (forthcoming 2013). 
4 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President. Re: 
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 
[hereinafter August 2002 Memo].  
5 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006). 
6 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].  
7 Memorandum for John Rizzo Acting General Counsel of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002) 
[hereinafter CIA Interrogation Memo].  
8 The memo concluded that the following ten techniques did not violate 18 
U.S.C. § 2340A:  
 
(1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap 
(insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) 
stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed in a 
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violate federal and international law.  Together, the opinions asserted 
that (1) the interrogation techniques proposed by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the military did not violate federal or 
international law (2), even if the techniques did, neither federal or 
international law placed limits on the power of the President as 
Commander-in-Chief to act in the war on terror (3), and thus the 
application of Section 2340 (domestic law prohibiting torture by 
officials of the U.S. government) to the interrogation of detainees 
would be an unconstitutional violation under the separation of 
powers doctrine.
9
  A third memo issued on March 14, 2003, 
Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel to the 
Department of Defense Re: Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful 
Combatants Held Outside the United States [hereinafter Military 
Interrogation Memo],
10
 asserted that enemy combatants held outside 
United States’ territory did not enjoy protection from federal law 
prohibiting torture.  
Much has been written on the OLC’s memos.  The 
scholarship on the memos have focused on the legal assertions made 
by the OLC
11
 as well as focused on why the August 2002, the CIA 
                                                          
confinement box, and (10) the waterboard . . . [All of which 
would] be used in some sort of escalating fashion, culminating 
with the waterboard, though not necessarily ending with this 
technique. 
 
CIA Interrogation Memo, supra note 7, at 2. 
9 See Garrison, supra note 3; Arthur H. Garrison, The Bush Administration 
and the Torture Memos: A Content Analysis of the Response of the Academic Legal 
Community, 11 (1) CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. (forthcoming 2012). 
10 Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel to the 
Department of Defense Re: Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants 
Held Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 2003) (on file with OLC) [hereinafter 
Military Interrogation Memo].  
11 See generally Arthur H. Garrison, Hamdi, Padilla and Rasul: The War 
on Terrorism on the Judicial Front, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 99 (2003); Arthur 
Garrison, The Bush Administration and the War on Terrorism on the Judicial Front 
II: The Courts Strike Back, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473 (2004); George C. Harris, 
The Rule of Law and the War on Terror: The Professional Responsibilities of 
Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409 
(2005); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White 
House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by 
the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. & POL’Y 455 (2005); David J. 
Gottlieb, How We Came to Torture, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449 (2005); Jordan 
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Interrogation, and Military Interrogation memos did not survive 
public scrutiny,
12
 as well as, the OLC’s subsequent withdrawal
13
 of 
all its 9/11 opinions.
14
  However, there has been less research focused 
on the proper role of the OLC when it provides legal advice to the 
President and how its advice differs from legal advice from other 
                                                          
J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law 
Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 811 (2005); Johannes van Aggelen, A Response to John C. Yoo, The Status of 
Soldiers and Terrorists Under The Geneva Conventions, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 167 
(2005); Louis-Philippe F. Rouilard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture 
Under International Law: The Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 9 (2005); Arthur H. Garrison, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Military 
Commissions, and Acts of Congress: A Summary, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 339 
(2006); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS (2006); Arthur Garrison, The Judiciary 
in Times of National Security Crisis and Terrorism: Ubi Inter Arma Enim Silent 
Leges, Quis Custodiet Ipso Custodies? 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 165 (2006); 
Cornella Pillard, Unitariness and Myopia: The Executive Branch, Legal Process, 
and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1297 (2006); Dawn Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the 
Laws: Internal Legal Constraints of Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 
(2007); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); Dawn Johnsen, All the President’s Lawyers: 
How to Avoid Another “Torture Opinion” Debacle, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & 
POL’Y (2007); Arthur Garrison, Hamiltonian and Madisonian Democracy, the Rule 
of Law and Why the Courts Have a Role in the War on Terror, 8 J. INST. JUST. & 
INT’L STUDIES 120 (2008); DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING 
THE UNTHINKABLE (2009); Joseph Lavitt, The Crime of Conviction of John Choon 
Yoo: The Actual Criminality in the OLC During the Bush Administration, 62 ME. 
L. REV. 155 (2010); Michael P. Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 389 (2010); Janet Cooper Alexander, John Yoo’s War Powers: The Law 
Review and the World, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 331 (2012). 
12 See Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General Re: 
Legal Standards Applicable under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Dec. 30, 2004) (on 
file with OLC) [hereinafter December 2004 Memo]; Garrison, supra note 3; 
Garrison, supra note 9. 
13 See December 2004 Memo, supra note 12. 
14 See David J. Barron, Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: 
Withdrawal of Office of Legal Counsel CIA Interrogation Opinions (Apr. 15, 2009) 
(on file with OLC) [hereinafter April 2009 Memo]; Memo for the Files: Re: Status 
of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter January 2009 Memo].  The 
January 2009 Memo together with the April 2009 Memo withdrew all of the 
controversial OLC post-9/11 opinions during the first two years of the Bush 
Administration.  See Garrison, supra note 3 (discussing the December 2004 Memo, 
January 2009 Memo, and April 2009 Memo). 
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Executive Branch attorneys.
15
  This article focuses on that question.  
Specifically, this article reviews the literature on executive legal 
opinion writing and asserts that during the first two years after the 
events of 9/11, the OLC under President Bush confused its role as a 
neutral expositor of the law with the role of legal policymaking.  Part 
II of this article reviews the literature on the role of attorneys within 
the Executive Branch and the differences within those roles in 
                                                          
15 For example, see Professor Gibson who observed that: 
 
Until recently, there was very little written about OLC whether 
popular press or scholarly work.  Indeed, until the George W. 
Bush administration, with few exceptions, the scholars who 
researched OLC were OLC alums themselves . . . . Despite all of 
the attention by former OLC attorneys and the popular media, 
and the obvious attention to political scientists to the executive 
branch, laws, public policy and the like, there is very little about 
the Office of Legal Counsel written by political scientists. 
 
Tobias T. Gibson, Office of Legal Counsel: Inner Workings and Impact, 18 LAW & 
COURTS 7, 7 (2008).  
Research on the OLC is almost nonexistent in comparison to the research 
on the Department of Justice in general or specifically on the Attorney General.  
See infra note 35.  Even the well cited Luther A. Huston only allocates one 
paragraph to the history and purpose of Office of Legal Counsel almost as an after 
thought.  LUTHER A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1967).  See also 
Frank M. Wozencraft, OLC: The Unfamiliar Acronym, 57 A.B.A. J. 33 (1971).  See 
generally Symposium, Government Lawyering, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
(1998) (a symposium of articles on the roles and duties of government lawyers).  A 
search in the ProQuest Dissertation and Theses database reveals that there are only 
four graduate/doctoral level works that provide specific detailed review of the 
history, purpose, or operation of the OLC.  See Arthur H. Garrison, The Rule of 
Law and What the Law Rules: The History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions on 
the Commander-in-Chief Power and the Department of Justice Office of Legal 
Counsel Torture and Commander-in-Chief Opinions During the First Two Years of 
the Bush Administration after September 11 (2011) (unpublished doctoral thesis) 
(on file at Northeastern University); William O’Donnal Sass, A Rhetorical History 
of the Office of Legal Counsel (2010) (unpublished thesis, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas) (on file with University of Nevada, Las Vegas); Tobias Tandy Gibson, 
The Office of Legal Counsel and the Presidency: The Legal Strategy of Executive 
Orders (2006) (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Washington University in St. Louis) (on 
file at Washington University in St. Louis);  James Michael Strine, The Office of 
Legal Counsel: Legal Professionals in a Political System (1992) (unpublished 
dissertation) (on file at Johns Hopkins University). 
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determining the meaning of law and policy making.  Part II also 
reviews opinions and articles on the role of the OLC, in comparison 
to other Executive Branch attorneys, by past Attorneys General and 
Assistant Attorneys General who served as heads of the OLC.  Part 
III places the proper role of the OLC in context with the 
administrative and political dynamics of the Executive Branch and 
the differing types of legal analysis that is required by the President 
to assist him in fulfilling his responsibility to faithfully execute the 
law.  Part III also provides a review of the administrative and 
political isolation by the Bush Administration of the State 
Department, Civilian Military Legal Advisors, and the Judge 
Advocates Generals’ (JAGs) legal opinions on the applicability of the 
Geneva Convention to the issue of interrogation and the rejection of 
the OLC opinions.  Specific attention is given to the legal opinions 
issued by the JAGs, as well as, the civilian military community to 
review the significance of OLC opinions upon executive branch 
policymaking.  Part IV concludes with a critique of the OLC within 
the context of its proper role in inter-executive branch legal policy 
and decision-making, and provides an explanation of the torture 
memos as the result of the failure of the Bush Administration’s OLC 
to maintain its institutional role as protector of the rule of law and the 
neutral expositor of what the law requires within the Executive Brach 
and the significance of that failure.
16
 
   
II.  THE OLC AND THE MODELS OF ADVISING THE PRESIDENT 
 
On November 15, 1992, Attorney General William Barr, who 
served as Attorney General (1991–1993), Deputy Attorney General 
(1990–1991) and as Assistant Attorney General of the OLC (1989–
1990) under the first Bush Administration, provided remarks at the 
Cardozo School of Law symposium on the role of the Attorney 
General, and his remarks were published in a symposium journal 
special issue.
17
  Under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, the 
President is authorized to ensure that the laws are faithfully 
executed.
18
  Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Attorney General is 
                                                          
16 See Garrison, supra notes 3 and 9. 
17 William Barr, Attorney General’s Remarks, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law, November 15, 1992, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 31 (1993). 
18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.    
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authorized to provide legal advice to the President when requested.  
And under Presidential Executive Orders, the OLC has the 
responsibility to provide binding opinions on all branches of the 
Executive Branch,
19
 except the Office of the Solicitor General.
20
  
                                                          
19 Garrison, supra note 2; Tobias T. Gibson, Office of Legal Counsel: 
Inner Workings and Impact, 19 LAW & COURTS 7, 8 (2009); Randolph D. Moss, 
Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office of Legal 
Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303 (2000).  See also John O. McGinnis, Executive 
Branch Interpretation of the Law, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.  21 (1993) (commenting on 
the OLC by past Assistant Attorneys Generals); Frank M. Wozencraft, OLC: The 
Unfamiliar Acronym, 57 A.B.A. J. 33 (1971); Symposium, Government Lawyering, 
61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1998). 
20 In affirming the basic assertion of independence of the Office of the 
Solicitor General by Solicitor General Francis Biddle in his book, In Brief 
Authority, Assistant Attorney General John Harmon informed the Attorney General 
that:  
 
[T]he Solicitor General has enjoyed two kinds of independence.  
First, he has enjoyed independence within the Department of 
Justice.  It is he, of all the officers in the Department, who has 
been given the task of deciding what the Government’s position 
should be in cases presented to the Supreme Court.  The views of 
subordinate officers within the divisions of the Department are 
not binding upon him, and the Attorney General has made it a 
practice not to interfere.  With respect to his relation to the 
Attorney General, we feel constrained to add, however, at the 
risk of repetition, that the Solicitor General’s independent role 
has resulted from a convenient and necessary division of labor, 
not from a separation of powers required by law.  Moreover, 
Francis Biddle may have overstated the case to some degree.  
Under the relevant statutes, as noted, the Attorney General 
retains the right to assume the Solicitor General’s function 
himself, if he conceives it to be in the public interest to do so. 
 
Secondly, the Solicitor General has enjoyed 
independence within the executive branch as a whole.  He is not 
bound by the views of his “clients.”  He may confess error when 
he believes they are in error.  He may rewrite their briefs.  He 
may refuse to approve their requests to petition the Court for 
writs of certiorari.  He may oppose (in whole or in part) the 
arguments that they may present to the Court in those instances 
where they have independent litigating authority. 
 
. . . . 
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General Barr asserted that the dual roles of the Attorney General, a 
counselor to the President (both in the political sense and the legal 
sense) and an arbiter of legal disputes within the Executive Branch, 
do not conflict because “the Attorney General’s ultimate allegiance 
must be to the rule of law.  In my experience, there has not been any 
substantial tension between the role of upholding the rule of law and 
the role of the Attorney General as a policy subordinate of the 
President.”
21
 
General Barr found that there was no conflict between the 
dual roles of the Attorney General because Barr viewed that the 
proper question posed to the Attorney General regarding the law will 
avoid conflicts.  “Much depends on the question that is asked . . . 
what is the right answer.  [W]hat is the legally right position?”
22
  
General Barr’s point is that the Attorney General should not be 
asked, and should not answer, the question “can you advance a 
reasonable argument to sustain a given action?”
23
  Note the 
                                                          
Substantive Considerations.  Once the Solicitor General 
has taken a position with respect to a pending case, that position 
will, in most cases, become the Government’s position as a 
matter of course. 
 
Memorandum for the Attorney General: The Role of the Solicitor General, 1 Op. 
O.L.C. 228, 230, 234 (Sept. 29, 1977); John M. Harmon, Memorandum Opinion 
for the Attorney General—Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1089 
(1988); FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 97 (1962).  See also infra Part IV. 
21 Barr, supra note 17, at  34–35. 
22 Id. at 35 (emphasis deleted).  General Bell similarly explained the 
Attorney General’s role in interpreting that law as follows: 
 
The increased complexity of our society and the government's 
relationship to it over the past several decades is reflected in the 
opinion-giving functions performed by the Attorney General and 
his subordinates.  Today, the subject matter encompassed by that 
function is as broad as the activities of the government itself.  It 
is not overstatement to say that, in this complex society, the need 
for sound legal advice in advance of governmental action has 
become particularly acute.  There is no substitute for doing 
something right the first time. 
 
Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer 
and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1064–65 
(1978). 
23 Barr, supra note 17, at 35.  
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difference.  The former question, what is the right position or what is 
the right answer, is seeking to know what the law requires or the best 
view of the law while the latter question, can you advance an 
argument to sustain an action, is trying to get the law to support an 
action already taken or desired to be taken.  The difference can also 
be viewed as that the former is about what the law says while the 
latter is a policy determination that is seeking legal support after the 
fact.  The distinction is not an act of legal sophistry because it is the 
difference between the Attorney General acting as nothing more than 
a private counsel seeking to justify his clients’ actions versus a quasi-
judicial officer protecting the law and the rule of law within the 
Executive Branch.  The difference is cognitive of the distinction 
between determining “what is ‘legal’ and what is ‘arguably legal’” 
and avoiding “extra-legal biases when interpreting the law.”
24
  It is 
proposed in this article that this cognitive distinction was lost on the 
Bush Administration’s OLC during the first two years after 9/11.
25
  
General Barr asserted that the proper question posed to an 
Attorney General should be: “[W]hat is the right legal answer—not 
whether we can provide a veneer of justification for a given action.”
26
  
General Barr reasoned that: 
 
Ultimately, if you attempt to push too hard—even as a 
matter of litigation risks—and take legal positions that 
clearly will not be sustained, or that are not 
responsible and reasonable legal positions, you will 
lose ground . . . . Our view has been that if we go into 
court with untenable positions and lose, we ultimately 
weaken the office of the President.
27
 
 
As General Barr correctly observed, the Executive Branch’s legal 
assertions of Presidential power that push beyond the accepted 
boundaries of the law as understood by the other branches of 
government, especially the Judiciary, will result in legal and political 
losses.  These losses will result in the weakening of the institutional 
                                                          
24 Michael Hatfield, Fear, Legal Indeterminacy and the American 
Lawyering Culture, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 511, 511 (2006). 
25 See infra Parts III and IV. 
26 Barr, supra note 17, at 36. 
27 Id. 
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powers of the Presidency and the strengthening of the checks on the 
Presidency.  This result is the opposite of what a President seeks to 
achieve.  President Truman experienced this loss in the Steel Seizure 
Case,
28
 as did President Bush in the unlawful combatant cases.
29
   
As to advising the President, General Barr made clear that the 
Attorney General, while keeping in mind that his ultimate allegiance 
was to the rule of law, “the Attorney General, unlike a typical lawyer, 
must pay close attention to consistency and precedent, rather than 
simply to the immediate interests of his client.  This necessary 
concern for continuity contributes to the Attorney General’s 
resistance to temporary political pressures.”
30
  General Barr 
recognized that the Attorney General is a political subordinate to the 
President and that the President has a right to implement political 
goals, but that does not mean that the Attorney General must bend 
the law to meet those political goals, but rather the Attorney General 
must defend the law from the waves of political necessity.  General 
Barr explained: 
 
Some observers might argue, therefore, that if both 
[policy] positions [on a dispute between agencies] are 
arguably correct, the Attorney General should, as the 
President’s legal advisor, favor the approach most 
consistent with the administration’s overall program . . 
. . In the context of resolving legal disputes under the 
executive order, we reject this view.  Furthering the 
administration’s policy goals is not our role in giving 
legal advice, and it is not our role in resolving 
disputes.  The question in both contexts is, what is the 
right legal answer . . . . Policy disputes are resolved 
elsewhere within the executive branch.  Any other 
arrangement would undermine the Attorney General’s 
credibility in rendering legal opinions.  Hence, both 
                                                          
28  Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
29 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723 (2008).  See also Arthur H. Garrison, National Security and Presidential 
Power: Judicial Deference and Establishing Constitutional Boundaries in World 
War Two and the Korean War, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 609 (2008-2009). 
30 Barr, supra note 17, at 36. 
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prudence and the President’s delegation of authority 
require the Attorney General to consider, when 
resolving disputes, not the administration’s policy 
objectives, but the rule of law.
31
 
 
Attorney General Griffin Bell agreed with this approach, 
asserting that the interest of the Attorney General is to primarily 
provide legal advice and interpret the law, both of which are separate 
from political policy making.  
 
[T]he Attorney General is removed from the 
policymaking and policy implementation processes of 
government, and this is especially true when he deals 
with legal questions that arise in the administration of 
departments other than his own.  It makes sense to 
assign the task of making definitive legal judgments to 
an officer who is not required, as a general matter, to 
play a decisive role in the formulation of policy.  Such 
an officer enjoys a comparative advantage over 
policymakers in the discharge of the lawgiving 
function.
32
 
 
It is this distinction between legal assessment and public policy that 
supports the quasi-judicial role of the Attorney General.
33
 
The Barr Doctrine
34
 is clear regarding the role of the 
Attorney General and, by designation, the role of the OLC.  The 
doctrine’s clarity is apparent within the specific context of legal 
interpretation and the protection of the rule of law.  It is in this 
context that makes the advice of the Attorney General and, by 
delegation, the OLC different than the advice provided by other 
lawyers within the Executive Branch.
35
  It is a truism that the 
                                                          
31 Id. at 37. 
32 Bell, supra note 22, at 1068. 
33 Garrison, supra note 2. 
34 See supra text accompanying notes 17, 21–23, 26–27. 
35 Garrison, supra note 2.  Steven G. Calabresi asserts that there are three 
types of government lawyers: administration legal advocates (political appointees 
who assert the legal philosophy of the current administration), court oriented 
conservatives (career civil service attorneys who advance legal principles in line 
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Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the OLC are 
political appointees, appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate.  As such, both officers are selected and confirmed based on 
their congruency with the jurisprudential and political ideologies of 
the President and, to a lesser degree, the U.S. Senate.  It is also a 
                                                          
with judicial precedent), and peacemaking ambassadors (attorneys who represent 
the views of administration to the judiciary with the goal of finding common legal 
ground between the two branches), and each type has its own role and interests 
within the executive branch.  Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme 
Court, and the Constitution: A Brief Positive Account of the Role of Government 
Lawyers in the Development of Constitutional Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
61 (1998).  See also Griffin Bell, Office of Attorney General’s Client Relationship, 
36 BUS. LAW. 791, 791 (1980–1981) (“But the fact is, if you are on the White 
House staff, you are working for the president in a much different sense than if you 
hold a confirmed position.”). 
Some Attorney Generals have defined their role as being separated from 
policy making and protecting the separation between those who make policy and 
those involved in litigation within the executive branch.  See Bell, supra note 22, at 
1069 (“I have played an important role as a buffer between our truly independent 
litigating lawyers in the Department of Justice, including the Solicitor General and 
his staff, and other government officials outside the Department of Justice.”). 
For general histories on the Attorney General and the operation of the 
Department of Justice, see JAMES S. EASBY-SMITH, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: 
ITS HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS (1904); HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, 
FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL 
EXECUTIVE (1937); ALBERT LANGELUTTIG, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1927); Frank Buckley, The Department of Justice: Its Origin, 
Development and Present Day Organization, 5 B.U. L. REV. 177 (1925); LUTHER 
A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1967); LUTHER A. HUSTON ET AL., 
ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (1968); GRIFFIN B. 
BELL & RONALD OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW (1982); LINCOLN CAPLAN, 
THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987); 
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION – A FIRST 
HAND ACCOUNT (1991); John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The 
Solicitor General’s Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 799 (1992); REBECCA M. SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS 
OF LAW (1992); CORNELL W. ClAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY (1992); DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (1992); 
NANCY BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789-1990 (1992); JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFF, MAIN 
JUSTICE: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATIONS CRIMINAL LAW 
AND GUARD ITS LIBERTIES (1996); RAYMOND WOLTERS, RIGHT TURN: WILLIAM 
BRADFORD REYNOLDS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 
(1996). 
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truism that the President will choose people with like-minded 
ideologies to help shape the operations of the Justice Department
36
 as 
                                                          
36 For an example of how political ideology governs Justice Department 
policy, compare how President Truman’s Attorney General explained the 
Administration’s view of criminal justice to those of President Nixon’s Attorney 
General: 
 
[W]ritten on the walnut panels that mark the walls, is the phrase: 
“The government wins when justice is done.”  So long as I am 
the Attorney General, that shall be the motto of the Department 
of Justice.  The government wins whether the defendant is found 
guilty or not, so long as he is given a fair trial.  The government 
wins when justice is done.  We represent both sides.  As your 
Attorney General, I am the people’s lawyer.  I am not the lawyer 
to prosecute; I am the lawyer to represent all the people. 
 
Tom Clark, The Office of the Attorney General, 19 TENN. L. REV. 150, 155 (1945). 
 
Here we do encounter a basic difference in policy and in 
philosophical approach between the present Attorney General 
and his predecessor.  Attorney General Clark's point of view, as 
indicated in Richard Harris’ recent book entitled Justice, appears 
to have been that the role of the Department of Justice was 
analogous to a European “Ministry of Justice,” where in effect 
the Department or Ministry is itself responsible for the end 
product that emerges from the administration of the system of 
criminal justice. 
Attorney General Mitchell, on the other hand, has felt 
that the Department of Justice is but one of the several 
instrumentalities engaged in the process of administering 
criminal justice, and that under our adversary system the role of 
the Department is basically that of advocate for the prosecution . 
. . . 
I think a very strong case can be made for the fact that a 
serious and crippling imbalance in the system of dispensing 
criminal justice would result if the Department of Justice 
assumed for itself not only the role of prosecutor, but of neutral 
referee and ultimate supervisor as to the type of product that is to 
emerge from the judicial mill.  
. . . .  
. . . If the two-party system in this country is to offer the 
voters any real choice between programs, it is surely not 
unreasonable to expect that there will be some changes in 
administration policy when a President of one party succeeds a 
President of another. 
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a whole and the work of the OLC in particular.  The Attorney 
General is part of the policy apparatus of a given President.  Thus, 
the Attorney General is expected to support the political agenda of 
the President, when the issues posed to the Attorney General are 
political.  But when the question posed involves the meaning and 
application of the law,
37
 the Attorney General’s job responsibilities 
shift and are no longer driven by the politics of a policy and the 
desire to support those policies in implementation.  General Bell, in 
1980, recounted the relationship between the Attorney General and 
the President and the White House staff when legal cases and 
determinations of how to handle such cases impacted and conflicted 
with the policy goals and objectives of the President.  In one case, 
Bell decided not to prosecute a case, which President Carter wanted 
prosecuted.
38
  General Bell concluded that the case came too close to 
double jeopardy.  Needless to say, there were calls for General Bell’s 
head.  General Bell explained how the situation ended: 
 
But the President got very upset with me because I 
would not prosecute the policeman.  He thought that 
the facts were so bad that we should prosecute it.  He 
told me that I had embarrassed him by refusing to 
prosecute the case. 
                                                          
William W. Rehnquist, The Old Order Changeth: The Department of Justice 
Under John Mitchell, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 255–56 (1970).  
Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney General for the OLC, is correct.  
Elections have consequences and the resulting change in ideology from a liberal to 
conservative Administration is appropriate and with it changes in overall 
Administration policy on interpretation of the law.  The only time this should not 
be true is when the Attorney General in a particular case advocates a particular 
political philosophy and goals contrary to the law or fails to give the best view of 
the law to questions posed by the President. 
37 General Bell defended the power of the Attorney General to control the 
legal arguments made before the Supreme Court in a situation in which President 
Carter ordered him to change the governments’ position.  General Bell went to see 
the President and “told him that we could not ethically change our position on this 
unless there had been a change in the law or the facts.  I said that I did not 
understand who had given him the advice to tell me to do this—but be that as it 
may, I simply could not do it, I would be ruined as a lawyer.  So he said, ‘Well, just 
hold on.  I don’t want to ruin you as a lawyer.  Just forget about the note I sent 
you.’”  Bell, supra note 22, at 794. 
38 Bell, supra note 35.  
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While I was out of the country, some people in the 
White House staff asked Ben Civiletti, my deputy, to 
reconsider my position.  Fortunately, Ben ruled in my 
favor.  And that is where the matter ended.  The 
President had a press conference and told the press a 
great thing.  He said, “I appoint the attorney general.  
The prosecutorial discretion is vested in the attorney 
general.  I can remove the attorney general, but I 
cannot tell him who to prosecute, I cannot tell him 
who not to prosecute.  That is a great thing for this 
country.”  He said, “I can remove him.  That is all I 
can do; and I am not prepared to remove the attorney 
general on account of this case.”  And that is the way 
the matter was left.
39
 
                                                          
39 Id. at 795–96.  “I can remove the attorney general, but I cannot tell him 
who to prosecute.”  Id.  The Office of the Attorney General has come a long way 
from President Andrew Jackson who, upon receiving an opinion from Attorney 
General Rodger Taney that the law did not authorize the President to remove U.S. 
funds from the national bank, curtly responded, “Sir, you must find a law 
authorizing the act or I will appoint an Attorney General who will.”  GRIFFIN B. 
BELL & RONALD OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 185 (1982) (quoting L. 
HUSTON, A. MILLER, S. KRISLOV & R. DIXON, ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1968)).  General Taney’s opinion feared little better 
than Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 
(1831), to which President Jackson responded “Mr. Marshall has made his 
decision.  Now let him enforce it!”  See NICHOLAS JOHN CULL, DAVID HOLBROOK 
CULBERT, & DAVID WELCH, PROPAGANDA AND MASS PERSUASION: A HISTORICAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1500 TO THE PRESENT 4 (2003).  Although this statement is 
famously attributed to President Jackson, it has been argued that he indeed never 
made it.  See JOHN ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, APPALACHIA: A HISTORY 403–04 
(2002); ROBERT V. REMINI, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 216 (1988); and John 
Yoo, Andrew Jackson and Presidential Power, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 521, 534 
(2008). 
In another case, General Bell defended the power of the President to 
overrule an opinion issued by the Attorney General but also defended the ethical 
responsibility of the Attorney General, when the issue involves the appearance of 
the government before the judiciary with the revised legal position based on the 
President’s decision, to so inform the court that the Attorney General had been 
overruled.   
 
So I wrote him and told him that, under the Constitution, he had 
every right to overrule me.  But, I added, he did not have the 
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As there is nothing new under the sun, the story told by 
General Bell is similar to the story that takes place a few decades 
later during the Bush Administration.  When James Comey, Acting 
Attorney General, refused to sign the extension of the National 
Security Agency Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), Alberto 
Gonzales, the White House Counsel, and Andrew Card, the 
President’s Chief of Staff, visited Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
while he was in the hospital for emergency surgery, to get him to 
overrule the decision by Comey.
40
  Comey, along with FBI Director 
Bob Mueller, Assistant Attorney General Jerry Goldsmith, and 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin, headed to the 
hospital upon learning that Gonzalez and Card were seeking to get 
Ashcroft to overrule him.  Comey, Philbin, and Goldsmith got to the 
hospital first and were sitting with Ashcroft and his wife when 
Gonzales and Card arrived with an envelope with a document 
authorizing the TSP extension.
41
  Upon receiving the request to sign 
the reauthorization, Ashcroft pulled himself up from his bed and told 
the White House delegation that the TSP program was 
unconstitutional as constituted, that he would not approve it, and in 
any event he was not the Attorney General, Comey was.
42
  After the 
                                                          
right to control my ethical obligations under rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and I would have to make my 
own judgment about whether I could support his position in 
court.  We resolved it by appearing and saying that we appeared 
at the direction of the Executive Department.  
 
Bell, supra note 35, at 796.  
40 Senate Judiciary Committee, Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is 
the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and firing of U.S. Attorneys, 
Serial No. J-110-14 Testimony by James Comey [hereinafter Comey Testimony], 
at 215, 220–21, (May 15, 2007).  See Office of Inspectors General, Departments of 
Defense, Justice, CIA, NSA, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program (July 10, 2009) 
Report No. 2009-0013-AS at 19–30 (July 10, 2009) [hereinafter OIG Report] for 
overall discussion of dispute between the White House the Justice department over 
the TSP including a timeline of the hospital incident.  The OIG Report refers to the 
TSP and the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP).  See also infra notes 117-
118. 
41 Comey Testimony, supra note 40, at 216; See also infra notes 117–118. 
42 Id.  See also HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH LAWYERS IN THE 
WAR ON TERROR 152–53 (2009); see infra notes 117–118. 
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hospital meeting Card called Comey and ordered him to come to the 
White House to discuss the matter, to which Comey said he would 
only come if a witness was present and that he would bring Solicitor 
General Ted Olsen.  Comey informed Card that the Justice 
Department could not provide a legal basis for the TSP program as 
currently constituted.
43
  The TSP program was reauthorized without 
Justice Department approval
44
 by President Bush on March 11th and 
Comey, along with Mueller and other key Justice Department 
officials including Ashcroft (according to his chief of staff), were 
prepared to resign.
45
  On Friday March 12th, (the day after the 
                                                          
43 Comey Testimony, supra note 40, at 217–18. 
44 Id at 218–19. 
45 Id. at 219.  See also OIG Report, supra note 40, at 27–29; BARTON 
GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHANEY VICE PRESIDENCY 316 (2006).  Comey testified: 
 
The program was reauthorized without us, without a signature 
from the Department of Justice attesting as to its legality.  And I 
prepared a letter of resignation intending to resign the next day, 
Friday, March the 12th . . . . I believed that I couldn’t—I couldn’t 
stay if the administration was going to engage in conduct that the 
Department of Justice had said had no legal basis.  I just simply 
couldn’t stay. 
 
Comey Testimony, supra note 40, at 218–19.  According to the OIG Report, when 
Mueller was made aware of the Department of Justice concerns over the legality of 
the TAP, “Vice President Cheney suggested that ‘the President may have to 
reauthorize without [the] blessing of DOJ,’” to which Mueller responded, “I could 
have a problem with that,” and that the FBI would “have to review legality of 
continued participation in the program.”  OIG Report, supra note 40, at 22.  After 
the hospital incident and President Bush signed the reauthorization under his 
authority as Commander–in–Chief, Mueller prepared a letter of resignation: 
 
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on March 12, 2004, FBI Director 
Mueller drafted by hand a letter stating, in part: “[A]fter 
reviewing the plain language of the FISA statute, and the order 
issued yesterday by the President . . . and in the absence of 
further clarification of the legality of the program from the 
Attorney General, I am forced to withdraw the FBI from 
participation in the program.  Further, should the President order 
the continuation of the FBI's participation in the program, and in 
the absence of further legal advice from the AG, I would be 
constrained to resign as Director of the FBI.”  Mueller told the 
DOJ OIG that he planned on having the letter typed and then 
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Madrid train bombings by an Al Qaeda cell in Spain) the President 
met with Comey and later with Mueller.  Although Comey in his 
testimony before the Senate would not discuss the substance of the 
meeting, it is reported that after Comey told the President that in his 
opinion the law did not support the TSP, President Bush “told him 
sharply, ‘I decide what the law is for the executive branch.’ [To 
which] Comey responded, ‘That’s absolutely true, sir, you do.  But I 
decide what the Justice Department can certify to and can’t certify to, 
and despite my absolute best efforts, I simply cannot in the 
circumstances.’”
46
  After the exchange, the President met with 
Mueller; and, after meeting with him, Bush retreated and told 
Mueller to inform Comey “to do what we believed, what the Justice 
Department believed was necessary to put this matter on a footing 
where we could certify to its legality.  And so we then set out to do 
that, and we did that.”
47
  According to the Office of Inspector 
General report on the TSP, Comey decided on March 12th not to 
                                                          
tendering it, but that based on subsequent events his resignation 
was not necessary. 
 
Id. at 27.  In written responses to Senator Charles Schumer following his 
testimony, Comey wrote that he believed that several senior DOJ officials, 
including Chuck Rosenberg, Daniel Levin, James Baker, David Ayres, and Deputy 
Chief of Staff to the Attorney General David Israelite, were also prepared to resign.  
Comey wrote that he believed that “a large portion” of his staff also would have 
resigned if he had.  Id. at 27 n. 18. 
46 BRUFF, supra note 42, at 154 (2009) (citing BARTON GELLMAN, 
ANGLER: THE CHANEY VICE PRESIDENCY 318 (2008)).  See also HOWARD BALL, 
BUSH, THE DETAINEES, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE BATTLE OVER PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2007); see infra notes 117–118.  
47 Comey Testimony, supra note 40, at 220, 223–24.  Gellman writes that 
while Bush and Comey met alone, Comey informed Bush that Mueller was 
prepared to resign over the issue, as he was, and that Bush responded in part by 
saying he had wished Comey had brought his concerns up before.  Gellman writes 
that Comey was surprised that Bush had not previously heard of the concerns that 
the Justice Department had and that if the President had been told otherwise he had 
been badly served by his staff.  In any event, Bush, fearing a mass resignation by 
Department of Justice staff and respecting (both on a personal and professional 
level) the views of FBI Director Mueller, backed down and told Mueller to tell 
Comey to make whatever changes were necessary.  GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 
317–20.  See also GRAFF, infra note 117, at 492.  Bush revised his March 11 
reauthorization to be subject to the approval of the Attorney General and 
Department of Justice.  OIG Report, supra note 40, at 29. 
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order the FBI to discontinue participation with the National Security 
Agency (NSA).  Subsequently, Goldsmith issued a memo to Comey 
stating the President’s determination that the TSP was lawful, 
conclusive (due to his constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief 
and as the holder of the power to faithfully execute the laws), and 
final on the legality of the program as well as binding on the 
Executive Branch.
48
  On March 16th, Comey informed the White 
House that the concerns of the Justice Department could not be 
rectified with the current operation of the TSP and recommended that 
it be discontinued, to which White House Counsel Gonzales 
responded:  
 
Your memorandum appears to have been based on a 
misunderstanding of the President’s expectations 
regarding the conduct of the Department of Justice.  
While the President was, and remains, interested in 
any thoughts the Department of Justice may have on 
alternative ways to achieve effectively the goals of the 
activities authorized by the Presidential Authorization 
of March 11, 2004, the President has addressed 
definitively for the Executive Branch in the 
Presidential Authorization the interpretation of the 
law.
49
 
 
Notwithstanding Gonzales letter on March 17th, the President 
modified and discontinued the aspects of the TSP that the 
Department of Justice determined were legally unsupportable.
50
 
President Bush dedicated two pages to this incident in his 
book Decision Points.
51
  According to the President, when he was 
informed that the Justice Department would not reauthorize the TSP, 
he asked where Ashcroft was and, upon being informed he was in the 
hospital, called Ashcroft and told him he was sending Card and 
Gonzales to get his signature.  The President writes that when he was 
                                                          
48 OIG Report, supra note 40, at 28. 
49 Id. at 28–29. 
50 Id. at 29.  According to Gellman, the letter was disavowed by Gonzales 
personally.  Gellman proposes that the letter was actually the work of David 
Addington.  GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 321. 
51 GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 172–74 (2010). 
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informed Ashcroft did not sign it he did so himself as head of 
Executive Branch.  The next day, Card told him that Comey was the 
Acting Attorney General and that he and other members of the 
Justice Department were going to resign.  President Bush writes that 
he was surprised and did not know of the dissent within Justice over 
the TSP or that Comey was the Acting Attorney General when he 
sent Card and Gonzales to the hospital to see Ashcroft.  When the 
President met with Comey he was informed that the dissent within 
the Justice Department was well known to his staff for weeks and 
that Comey and Mueller were prepared to resign.  President Bush 
writes that there were voices within the Executive Branch that 
advocated that he stand his ground and reauthorize the TSP over the 
Justice Department objections:  
 
I was willing to defend the powers of the Presidency 
under Article II.  But not at any cost.  I thought about 
the Saturday Night Massacre in October 1973 . . . . 
That was not a historical crisis I was eager to 
replicate.  It wouldn’t give me much satisfaction to 
know I was right on legal principle while my 
administration imploded and our key programs in the 
War on Terror were exposed in the media firestorm 
that would inevitably follow.
52
  
 
When the President confirmed that Mueller would in fact resign, he 
ordered the Justice Department to adjust the program to meet its 
concerns.  
When the story of the midnight hospital incident (March 10, 
2004) came to light it only further added to the contempt that the 
Bush Administration had been receiving regarding its post 9/11 
policies.  Although visiting a sick Attorney General in his hospital 
bed, discussing classified policies in an open hospital room in front 
of his protesting wife, to get a reversal of a ruling by an Acting 
Attorney General is truly pushing well past the envelope, as General 
Bell’s story clearly shows it was not unheard of to try to go around an 
opinion by an Attorney General once the Attorney General is 
temporarily indisposed.  As both General Bell and Acting General 
                                                          
52 Id. at 173–74. 
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Comey demonstrated, in the context of the law, the Attorney General 
is expected to have fidelity to the law and not the mere policy desires 
of the President.  The distinction between politics and policy versus 
the defense and authority of the law is why the daily duties of 
defining and defending the law within the Executive Branch have 
been delegated from the President to the Attorney General and the 
OLC.  It is only in the context of defining, defending, and 
implementing the law does the Barr Doctrine take hold. 
In describing the significance of the OLC, Theodore B. Olsen, 
Assistant Attorney General for the OLC from 1981 to 1984 explained 
that while “most other government officials have substantive 
programmatic responsibilities, the chief responsibility of the head of 
OLC is the preservation of the Constitution and the rule of law within 
an administration.”
53
  But more importantly the OLC is looked upon 
as “the legal conscience of the Executive Branch” because “a popular 
but legally questionable course must be resisted because of legal 
standards, the head of OLC is sometimes the first, and almost always 
the last, line of resistance.”
54
  James Comey, in a speech to a meeting 
of NSA attorneys,
55
 reflected the views of Generals Olsen and Barr 
regarding conflicts between the law and policy and the role of 
government attorneys:  
 
At the outset, we know that we are a nation of laws, 
not men.  We have chosen a profession that 
internalizes that truth.  We know that the rule of law 
sets this nation apart and is its foundation.  We also 
know that we took an oath to support the constitution 
of the United States.  We know that there may be 
agonizing collisions between our duty to protect and 
our duty to that constitution and the rule of law. 
. . . . 
We also know—at the risk of sounding 
parochial—that once we give our legal blessing, the 
individual policymakers, the operators—good people 
                                                          
53 Theodore B. Olsen, Judge Wilkey and the Office of Legal Counsel, 1985 
BYU L. REV. 607, 609 (1985). 
54 Id. 
55 James Comey, Intelligence Under the Law, 10 GREEN BAG 439, 443 
(2007). 
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though they may be—won’t be there.  In fact, if the 
stuff has really hit the fan, we know what will be said: 
“We never told the lawyer what to say.”  And: “We 
simply asked him/her what was permissible.”  But we 
also know that we won’t be alone in that imaginary 
calm, well-lit room—blazingly lit by hindsight.  With 
us will be the reputation of our great institutions, the 
institutions we love because they do so much good 
over so many years.  We know that damage to the 
reputation of that institution will cause harm for years 
to come, as our institution recovers from scandal or 
allegations of abuse of authority . . . .  
The lawyer is the custodian of so much.  The 
custodian of our own personal reputations, surely.  But 
more importantly, the custodian of our institutional 
reputations.  And most importantly of all, the 
custodian of our constitution and the rule of law. 
It is the job of a good lawyer to say “yes.”  It is 
as much the job of a good lawyer to say “no.”  “No” is 
much, much harder.  “No” must be spoken into a 
storm of crisis, with loud voices all around, with lives 
hanging in the balance.  “No” is often the undoing of a 
career.  And often, “no” must be spoken in 
competition with the voices of other lawyers who do 
not have the courage to echo it. 
For all those reasons, it takes far more than a 
sharp legal mind to say “no” when it matters most.  It 
takes moral character.  It takes an ability to see the 
future.  It takes an appreciation of the damage that will 
flow from an unjustified “yes.”  It takes an 
understanding that, in the long-run, intelligence under 
law is the only sustainable intelligence in this 
country.
56
 
 
Subservience to the rule of law and the law itself has 
consequences to policy and politics, and it is not uncommon for the 
law to stand in the way of popular policy determinations.  As Comey 
                                                          
56 Id. at 443–44. 
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confirms, the rule of law matters when policy is made and political 
power is exercised because both have long and short-term political 
and institutional consequences.  Policy and political power are not 
the same; but both, in times of crisis, can oppose the rule of law.  The 
role of the Attorney General and the OLC is to defend the rule of law 
in times of crisis by taking the long-term institutional consequences 
into account when dealing with the hot short-term desires of the 
Executive Branch.  As General Olsen observed, when the law 
demands a specific result, “the head of the OLC is [sometimes] a 
solitary voice when everyone around him, including those for whom 
he works, have powerful reasons for overriding or ignoring his 
judgment.”
57
  In those situations, the OLC only has its institutional 
and moral standing to prevail over the powers of politics and policy.  
Part of that moral authority rises out of the institutional respect it 
commands for producing legal opinions that are unbiased and neutral 
in protecting the rule of law and correctly asserting what the law 
rules.  As General Barr asserted, that is done, in part, by providing 
the best view of the law and, as Moss proposes, being a neutral 
expositor of the law.
58
   
Randolph D. Moss approached Executive Branch 
interpretation of the law from the perspective of the OLC by 
advocating the Neutral Expositor model.
59
  Writing in the 
Administrative Law Review while holding the position of Assistant 
Attorney General for the OLC in the Clinton Administration, Moss 
explained that as a fundamental matter the Executive Branch 
perpetually gives meaning to the law because it is responsible for 
executing the law, and this fact has significant legal ramifications 
because in the vast majority of cases “[E]xecutive [B]ranch 
interpretation is not subjected to judicial review [because] at times, 
no particular individuals are adversely affected by an [E]xecutive 
[B]ranch legal interpretation.”
60
  It is a truism that all interpretation 
of the law involves some level of advocacy.  This is true because the 
law is seldom so clear and unambiguous that only one possible view 
                                                          
57 Olsen, supra note 53, at 609. 
58 Barr, supra note 17; Comey, supra note 55; Moss, infra note 59. 
59 Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A 
Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1303 
(2000). 
60 Id. at 1304. 
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of the law is available.  There is a difference between those attorneys 
whose role is to provide the best view of the law regardless of the 
policy preferences of the President and those attorneys in the 
government who have the responsibility to advocate the meaning of 
the law within the confines of whether the view of the law advocated 
by the President can be accepted in a court of law.  For example, the 
Solicitor General approaches the law by determining if a particular 
view of the law will find traction with the court.  Note that the 
question for the Solicitor General is not what is the best view of the 
law (a point to be discussed below) but is the view proposed viable.  
This approach, the Court Advocacy model, is distinguished from 
lawyers who have the responsibility to develop public policy that has 
some aspects of law, the Public Legal Policy Advocacy model.
61
  
Public legal policy advocacy operates within the realm of politics.  
While Court advocacy focuses on whether a court will find a legal 
interpretation viable, public legal policy advocacy focuses on 
whether the court of public opinion will find a legal policy viable.
62
  
For example, a President is elected who believes that the death 
penalty is constitutional and that the federal government should 
support its implementation through appropriate legislation.  He 
informs the Attorney General to work with Congress to pass 
appropriate legislation.  The legal issues involved in drafting and 
supporting such legislation is public legal policy advocacy.  In the 
context of court advocacy and public legal policy advocacy, it is not 
the role of the Attorney General, the White House General Counsel, 
or the staff of the Office of Legal Policy to ask what the best view of 
the law is, but to secure the policy that the President supports.  In this 
example, the law is being made in the political sense, and it is totally 
appropriate for the Attorney General and others to make the law or 
change the law to suit their needs and desires.  Notice that the OLC is 
not included in the list of government attorneys who deal in court 
advocacy and public legal policy advocacy.
63
  The OLC addresses 
                                                          
61 Calabresi, supra note 35, at 70, 73; Wendel, infra note 84, at 1341–49; 
Harris, infra note 86, at 422–27; Note, infra note 95; Clement, infra note 187. 
62 Clement, infra note 187; Lund, infra note 83; Wendel, infra note 84; 
Clark, supra note 11. 
63 Clement, infra note 187.  See also supra notes 61–62 and Douglas W. 
Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary 
Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337 (1993). 
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the question that Moss and Barr address, what is the best view of the 
law? 
Moss explains that, when the context is focused on “the 
legality of a proposed Executive Branch action,” the opinion 
provided should seek the “best view of the law;” and like “a judge, 
the lawyer shuns consideration of his client’s desired policy goals 
and acts instead with complete impartiality.”
64
  In other words under 
the Neutral Expositor model when the issue is one regarding the 
meaning of the law, the lawyer should: 
 
[S]eek ways to further the legal and policy goals of the 
administration [but] do so, however, within the 
framework of the best view of the law and, in that 
sense should take the obligation neutrally to interpret 
the law as seriously as a court.  This is particularly so 
for the Attorney General, and by delegation, the 
Office of Legal Counsel.”
65
  
 
As discussed above, General Barr came to the same conclusion
66
 that, 
when the question involves the meaning of the law, the role of the 
Attorney General and the OLC is to ask “what is the right answer”
67
 
leaving to the Solicitor General the question “can you advance a 
                                                          
64 Moss, supra note 59, at 1305–06. 
65 Id. at 1306. 
66 General Barr wrote regarding the interaction between the Constitution 
and the rule of law in relation to the role of the Attorney General as follows: 
 
The unique position of the Attorney General raises special 
considerations.  The Attorney General’s oath to uphold the 
Constitution raises questions whether his duty lies ultimately 
with the President who appointed him or more abstractly with 
the rule of law. I said in my confirmation hearings, and have 
said several times since, that the Attorney General’s ultimate 
allegiance must be to the rule of law . . . . As with any lawyer, 
the Attorney General best serves his client by providing 
unvarnished, straight-from-the-shoulder legal advice as to what 
the attorney General thinks the law is, without regard to political 
considerations.”  
 
Barr, supra note 17, at 34–35. 
67 Id. at 35. 
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reasonable argument to sustain a given action before the courts.”
68
  
Moss explains that there are several reasons why the Attorney 
General and the OLC should “strive to find the best view of the law, 
rather than to accept (and endorse) any reasonable argument that 
promotes the goals and interests of the President.”
69
 
 
[T]he . . . most compelling reason why the Attorney 
General and the Office of Legal Counsel must accept 
only the strongest legal arguments is that the 
Constitution mandates that the Executive [B]ranch 
interpret and apply the law—no less than the courts—
as objectively and accurately as possible. 
. . . .  
[T]he Framer’s intent to stress the President’s 
obligation to perform his duties with a steadfast and 
principled adherence to the law.  The obligation is not 
to execute the law in a reasonable or colorable 
manner, but in a faithful manner.
70
 
 
The Constitution authorizes the President to Take Care that the laws 
are faithfully executed and that he is sworn by oath to faithfully 
execute the duties of his office to the best of his ability.
71
  Moss 
concludes that when placing these two clauses together a President is 
required to “use all of his abilities . . . to ‘preserve’ the 
Constitution.”
72
  Thus, a President who interprets the law and the 
Constitution “without regard for its best construction and application, 
but rather based on the expediency of the day, could hardly be said to 
be preserving the Constitution to the best of his ability.”
73
 
 
Against this background, the duty of the Executive 
Branch lawyer to provide the best, as opposed to a 
merely colorable, view of the law to his or her client is 
plain . . . . The [E]xecutive [B]ranch has no authority 
                                                          
68 Clement, infra note 187. 
69 Moss, supra note 59, at 1311. 
70 Id. at 1312–13. 
71 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3. 
72 Moss, supra note 59, at 1315.  
73 Id. 
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to act beyond the authority provided by the 
Constitution or statutes of the United States, and, if 
the Constitution and relevant statutes are best 
construed to preclude a proposed policy or action, it is 
largely irrelevant whether a reasonable argument 
might be made in favor of the legality of the proposal  
. . . . A reasonable argument might diminish the 
political cost of the contemplated action and it might 
avoid embarrassment in the courts, but it cannot 
provide the authority to act.  Only the best view of the 
law can do that.
74
  
 
It is the failure to submit the best view of the law, and not a 
reasonable or merely legally viable view of the law in order to meet 
the needs of the Bush Administration, which resulted in the errors 
within the OLC torture memos.  
Professor John O. McGinnis, who served in the OLC as an 
Attorney Advisor (1985–1987) and as a Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General (1987–1991) in the Reagan and Bush Administrations, 
agreed with the traditional views expressed by General Barr along 
with Moss and Comey that the role of the Attorney General is to aid 
the President in the implementation of his legal responsibilities to 
faithfully execute the laws and govern his administration under the 
rule of law.  Though it is a truism that “the Constitution gives the 
President these legal responsibilities, it does not expressly define how 
they should be exercised and therefore has left substantial room for 
disagreement concerning the Attorney General’s obligation as a legal 
advisor and opinion writer.”
75
  McGinnis provides three models on 
the role of the Attorney General in regard to serving the needs of the 
President: the Court-Centered model, the Independent Authority 
model, and the Situational model.
76
  The Court-Centered model 
proposes that legal advice provided by the Attorney General must 
reflect and be limited to judicial precedent.
77
  The Independent 
                                                          
74 Id. at 1316. 
75 John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney 
General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 375, 380 (1993). 
76 Id. at 380–81. 
77 Id. at 382–84. 
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Authority model proposes that the Attorney General and the President 
should interpret the law as they deem it proper independent of 
judicial precedent.
78
  The Situational model proposes that the 
Attorney General and the President should interpret the law in line 
with their political goals and policy objectives.
79
  McGinnis suggests 
that the differences between these models, when viewed with “a 
more refined analysis” are not as “substantial as might at first 
appear.”
80
  
All three models are reflective of the Court Advocacy and 
Public Legal Policy advocacy approaches.  The Court-Centered 
model presupposes that the Attorney General will propose 
interpretations of the law that would prevail or at least could prevail 
in litigation.  As discussed in Part III, this is the approach of the 
Solicitor General’s Office, not the OLC.  This approach requires that 
the legal opinion of the Executive Branch must be in congruence 
with legal precedent.  Thus, the Attorney General is free to choose 
among various reasonable theories of the law that are in line with 
court precedent and meet the policy goals of the President.  But as 
Barr and Moss assert, the point of the legal opinion of the Attorney 
General (and the OLC) on what the law requires when advising a 
president, the focus of the opinion should not be what can be argued 
realistically in court, but what is the best answer (the best view of the 
law) to the question presented or policy proposed.  The Independent 
Authority model and the Situational model are clearly within the 
public legal policy advocacy approach.  The Independent Authority 
model rests upon the idea that the President, co-equal with the 
judiciary, has equal authority to determine what the Constitution and 
federal statutes mean independent of the Judiciary—the very 
argument that General Bates made on behalf of President Lincoln 
against the argument of Chief Justice Taney in the Ex parte 
Merryman.
81
  The Situational model rests on the proposition that the 
President is elected to implement certain policies and goals, and he is 
at liberty to interpret the law in ways that advance the 
                                                          
78 Id. at 389.  
79 Id. at 389–401. 
80 McGinnis, supra note 75, at 381. 
81 ARTHUR H. GARRISON, SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY, WAR AND TERRORISM: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2011). 
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implementation of those goals and policies.  In other words, the 
President is at liberty to see the law as a means and not an end.  
All three of the models, taken to an extreme, could result in 
serious Constitutional conflicts with the two other branches of 
government, but historically such views have been tempered by the 
practical political nature of governing.  As a practical matter, as 
observed by past Attorneys General, many of the legal 
determinations made by the Attorney General will not be reviewed or 
addressed by the judiciary, and as such, he or she will have the ability 
to independently determine what the legal answers to those questions 
are.  In other words, court precedent may be silent on the issue.  The 
Situational model proposes that the Attorney General is at liberty to 
answer legal questions in light of the goals of the President.  But as a 
practical matter, a President has a Congress, a public press, and the 
American people to contend with, each having its own view of what 
the law requires.  An Attorney General can propose that President 
Bush does not need a Congressional resolution to go to war with Iraq 
as a legal matter, but the politics of the matter may require him to 
seek such a resolution—as it required President Bush to do in 
January 1991.
82
  The problem with all three models is that they make 
the law subject to policy and do not seek to meet the values within 
the Barr Doctrine or the Neutral Expositor model of providing the 
best view of the law.  The significance of the rule of law is that it 
rules over politics and power, the rule of law is the highest authority.  
The Barr Doctrine and the Neutral Expositor models honor and 
enforce that final authority; the Court-Centered, the Independent 
Authority, and the Situational models at best place policy and politics 
on equal footing with the law and at worst, places the rule of law as 
subservient with only the counter balancing powers of Congress, the 
Judiciary, and public outcry as its protector. 
Another approach to the role of the Attorney General in 
providing legal advice is the Private Lawyer model.  Professor 
Nelson Lund, who served as an attorney advisor in the OLC (1986–
1987) in the Reagan Administration and the White House Associate 
Counsel to the President (1989–1992) in the first Bush 
Administration, describes the Private Lawyer model as requiring the 
                                                          
82 Arthur Garrison, Hamiltonian and Madisonian Democracy, the Rule of 
Law and Why the Courts Have a Role in the War on Terror, 8 J. INST. JUST. & 
INT’L STUD. 120 (2008). 
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Attorney General to provide legal analysis the same way a lawyer in 
private practice would. 
 
In private practice, the client sets the objectives and 
the lawyer’s function is to help the client understand 
the legal constraints and risks that should be weighed 
by the client in pursuing those objectives.  The quality 
of the advice is measured by the degree to which it 
enables the client to make fully informed decisions, 
and, when the advisor is presented with those 
interesting cases that call for “creative lawyering,” by 
the lawyer’s success in devising ways to lower the risk 
. . . entailed in pursuing the objectives set by the 
client.
83
 
 
Another way to view the Private Lawyer model is in how the 
advice is provided.  The private lawyer, when asked if a particular 
action is legal, will respond from the point of view of whether a court 
in hindsight will find the action lawful.
84
  Government attorneys 
applying this model, with the focus being on the ambitions and 
policies of their client, i.e., the President, would respond in the form 
of approving hesitation—“While I think it’s a stretch to argue that the 
AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force] supersedes the 
warrant requirement in FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act], 
it’s not a ridiculous argument, so if you’re willing to accept the risk 
of losing in court, you can go for it.”
85
  The point being that the 
Private Lawyer model accepts that the judiciary will have the final 
say as to what the law means, but the private attorney is not bound to 
provide the best view of the law.  Nor is the attorney bound to 
develop legal reasoning as a court would (Court-Centered model) if 
it does not serve the political interests of the President.  Of course as 
a side point, the time between the implementation of a policy with a 
facially reasonable legal justification and the final rejection of that 
policy by the Supreme Court can be years, and the time difference 
                                                          
83 Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of the Legal Counsel, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 448 (1993). 
84 See W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the 
Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333 (2009). 
85 Id. at 1346. 
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alone may serve the political and/or policy interests of the President.  
The private lawyer approach is only limited by the requirement that 
the legal assertion is made in good faith and as long as it is facially 
reasonable, the government attorney proposing it and defending it in 
court will not risk sanctions or disbarment.
86
  
The Private Lawyer model derives its context from the 
adversarial system.  As Professor Wendel explains, the “adversary 
system . . . enacts a normative division of labor among various 
institutional actors, responding to political needs such as limiting 
government power and enhancing accountability”
87
 and applying the 
law to specific circumstances and facts.  The goal of the adversarial 
system, from the litigant’s point of view, is not establishing the best 
view of the law or fidelity to the law over the litigant’s own interests, 
but defending a reasonable view of the law in good faith to a neutral 
third party against an equally plausible view of the law by one’s 
adversary.
88
  In private litigation, the point is which side can prevail 
                                                          
86 See George C. Harris, The Rule of Law and the War on Terror: The 
Professional Responsibilities of Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11, 1 
J. NAT’L SEC. L. POL’Y 409, 418 (2005) (“The legal profession’s standards of 
conduct offer surprisingly little guidance specifically for lawyers who advise the 
government on legal issues”).  Although Professor Harris concluded that the OLC 
“torture memos” were clearly drafted under the Private Lawyer model and failed to 
provide a full view and accounting of the law in order to serve and support the 
Bush Administration policy as well as failed to adhere to the classical traditions 
(Barr Doctrine and the Neutral Expositor best view of the law approach) of OLC 
opinion writing, he could not conclude that the opinions violated ABA professional 
rules of conduct.  Id.  This was the same conclusion reached by Associate Deputy 
Attorney General David Margolis who reversed an Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) report that concluded that John Yoo and Jay Babee had 
engaged in professional misconduct and should be reported to their state bar 
associations.  See David Margolis, Memorandum for the Attorney General and 
Deputy Attorney General: Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to 
the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional 
Responsibility’s Report of Investigation in the Office of Legal Counsel’s 
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use 
of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists (January 5, 
2010) [hereinafter Margolis Opinion].  
87 Wendel, supra note 84, at 1347. 
88 As Professor Wendel explains, “I have never understood why this 
argument from the adversary system is thought to prove anything about legal 
advising outside the litigation context.”  Id.  “Litigation is a special case because 
lawyers are permitted to assert the arguable legal entitlements of clients, leaving it 
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in court with a facially reasonable argument
89
 on the applicable law, 
not establishing and defending the best view of the law under the 
Constitution.  It is this normative difference that makes the Private 
Lawyer model inapplicable to the roles of the Attorney General and 
the OLC when they are tasked with providing legal advice to the 
President.  It is because the Attorney General and the OLC are 
delegated the responsibility to preserve, protect, and defend the law 
above policy and politics that both offices are endowed with quasi-
judicial power within the Executive Branch to determine the meaning 
of the law. 
Professor Lund correctly observes that in the absence of the 
client’s interests as the central motivator of the Attorney General’s 
advice, the process of the Attorney General in legal opinion writing 
will become quasi-judicial.
90
  Although he is correct, he is wrong as 
to why.  The reason is not that “removing the constraint of serving a 
client’s interest [will] leave him free either to enjoy the intellectual 
pleasure of expressing uninhibitedly his own opinion of what the law 
is or to promote other interests of his own;”
91
 but, the removal of the 
political interests of the President in lieu of the interest and dictates 
of the law will result in making the Attorney General a neutral 
expositor of law in line with the Barr Doctrine.  To paraphrase Chief 
Justice John Marshall, when the Attorney General gives an opinion 
on the meaning of the law, he or she must remember it is the law he 
or she is espousing.  Legal ethics that govern private attorneys make 
clear that their role is to serve the purposes and goals of the client, 
not the best view of the law or the law itself.  They are required, 
under the pain of sanction or disbarment, to serve the client without 
                                                          
up to the workings of the adversary system to evaluate whether the lawyer’s 
position is plausible.”  Id. at 1348. 
89 Professor Wendel might assert that I am overstating the looseness that 
private litigators can engage in regarding the assertion of a particular view of the 
law on behalf of their clients because lawyers cannot assert views of the law that 
are not grounded in established law, they are obligated to site governing law even if 
the opposing counsel fails to disclose such law, and can be sanctioned for 
overreaching or stretching the applicability of the law in their arguments.  Id.  All 
true and conceded, but the point is not that private attorneys are without limits, but 
government attorneys—the Attorney General and the OLC—have a higher 
minimum standard than private attorneys in litigation.   
90 Lund, supra note 83, at 441. 
91 Id. at 447. 
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clearly breaking the law.  The private attorney has, and is required to 
have, fidelity to his client and the interest of his client, not to the 
law.
92
  While private attorneys are not required to seek, serve, 
protect, and assert the best view of the law, the Attorney General and 
the President are required to do so by both their oaths and statutory 
law to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
93
 above their 
political policy interests.  The relationship between the Attorney 
General and the President, when the meaning of the law is concerned, 
is to place the Constitution and the law above policy and politics.  
This is why the Private Lawyer model is inapplicable, both because 
the Attorney General is not any private lawyer serving his clients 
                                                          
92 For a contrary view on the ethical normative aspects of the 
responsibility of the private lawyer, Attorney General Michael Mukasey, in an 
address to the graduates of Boston Law School in 2008, stated that:  
 
If the lawyer’s best reading of the law permits some policy, he 
has a professional obligation to say that it would be lawful—even 
if he personally disagrees with it, or recognizes that it may one 
day prove politically controversial.  Just as important—perhaps 
more important—if the lawyer believes that some policy would 
be unlawful, he has a professional and ethical obligation to say 
no—even if some people think that the policy is critical.  The 
rule of law, and the oath every public servant takes to support 
and defend the Constitution, depend on it. 
. . . The lawyer in private practice must not confuse his 
client’s interest with the law; he has an obligation to say no if no 
is the right answer, even if the client doesn't want to hear it.  The 
lawyer pursuing what he believes to be the public interest must 
not confuse personal views on what the law ought to be for what 
the law is . . . .  
In becoming lawyers, you are becoming the custodians 
of a trust—a trust whose assets are the rule of law and the justice 
that results from that rule of law.  Being a custodian of that trust 
carries with it solemn responsibilities . . . . 
 
Michael Mukasey, The Role of Lawyers in the Global War on Terrorism, 32 B.C. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 179, 185 (2009). 
93 The Constitution requires the President to preserve, protect, and defend 
the Constitution and faithfully to the best of his ability execute the office of 
President which includes the responsibility to take care that the laws, not political 
policies, are faithfully executed.  U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.  The Attorney 
General’s oath obligates him to “support and defend the Constitution” and to “bear 
true faith and allegiance to the same.”  5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1988).   
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personal goals and ambitions and the President is not any client who 
seeks legal advice to serve his own desires.
94
  Both seek the other in 
the service of the law and the Constitution.  It is this understanding 
that provides the Attorney General and the OLC the power and 
responsibility to act quasi-judicially when providing opinions on the 
meaning of the law—because it is the law that is being espoused. 
The public application of the Private Lawyer model is the 
Agency Loyalty model, which focuses on the government attorney’s 
duty and loyalty to the agency that employs him, and that relationship 
applies the same legal and ethical responsibilities that govern the 
private lawyer.
95
  Thus, the role of the government lawyer under the 
Agency Loyalty model is to serve the interests and goals of the 
agency just as a private attorney would serve the interests of his 
client.  As one commentator observed: 
 
Of course it should be remembered that while the 
government lawyer is part of the agency, the 
government lawyer is not the agency.  Thus, the 
lawyer does not bear full responsibility for the 
agency’s final outcome; rather, the lawyer bears 
                                                          
94 The Private Lawyer model fails for another normative reason.  The 
model raises the question of what is the client’s purpose for asking the attorney’s 
advice. 
 
[O]ne who contends that a government lawyer need provide only a 
colorable legal basis for a proposed course of action has the burden to 
explain why a lawyer, seeking to ascertain whether a client has a legal 
entitlement to do something, should be content to get the answer only 
approximately right . . . . In the legal counseling context, the reason clients 
seek merely colorable advice is that they are interested in getting away 
with something that is not a genuine legal right.  
 
Wendel, supra note 84, at 1348.  In a counseling context, the best view of the law 
involves the assessment of what “the client’s right probably is, and what the 
client’s right likely is not.”  Id.  The point being in the Private Lawyer model 
counseling context “a lawyer’s job is to find the limits of the client’s legal 
entitlements, because the client is only permitted to act with legal authorization.”  
Id. at 1349.  Such is the minimum that is required with private parties.   
95 Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency 
Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1170 (2002). 
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responsibility for faithfully fulfilling her role in the 
process.
96
 
 
The Agency Loyalty model could be considered as a mode for the 
Barr Doctrine or the Neutral Expositor model if it is the goal that the 
agency (the OLC for our purposes) is to provide the best view of the 
law to the President and cabinet officers regardless of their individual 
desire to have the law support their initiatives.  The role of attorneys 
within the OLC is not to make policy choices for the Department of 
Justice or the President but to provide a neutral best view of the 
law.
97
  The Agency Loyalty model can facilitate this result when the 
work of the OLC includes the goal of not proposing, as the Bush 
Administration OLC did, politically useful general constitutional 
views of executive power to serve the perceived national security 
needs of the nation after 9/11.  The faithful fulfilling of his or her role 
in the OLC process is to present the best view of the law, not the 
most policy congruent, legally plausible view of the law. 
During the first two years after 9/11, John Yoo and others 
within the administration adopted, supported, and implemented a 
strong version of the Private Lawyer model in which it was assumed 
that the “Justice Department and specifically OLC serve in part as the 
lawyers for the executive branch.
98
  [And it] exists to interpret the 
Constitution and federal law for the executive branch”
99
 in that order 
and for that purpose.  As Jack Goldsmith, former Assistant Attorney 
General for the OLC, wrote in The Terror Presidency: 
 
Especially on national security matters, I would work 
hard to find a way for the President to achieve his 
ends.  Whenever I advised the White House that a 
proposed action was legally problematic, I would try 
to suggest ways to achieve its goals through 
alternative and legally available means. 
. . . Legal advice to the President from the 
Department of Justice is neither like advice from a 
private attorney nor like a politically neutral ruling 
                                                          
96 Id. at 1181.  
97 See supra notes 17, 55, 59, 61–63 and accompanying text. 
98 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 186 (2006).  
99 Id. at 19. 
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from a court.  It is something inevitably, and 
uncomfortably, in between. 
OLC also needn’t look at legal problems the 
way courts do.  Most Americans (including most 
lawyers) think the law is what courts say it is, and they 
implicitly equate legal interpretation with judicial 
interpretation.  But the executive branch does not have 
the same institutional constraints as courts, especially 
on national security issues where the President’s 
superior information and quite different 
responsibilities foster a unique perspective.
100
 
 
Goldsmith was even more candid when he concluded that “[his] job 
was to make sure the President could act right up to the chalk line of 
legality.”
101
  Although he wrote that he was in agreement with the 
Barr Doctrine,
102
 he also wrote candidly that the goal of OLC 
opinion writing during the initial post 9/11 years was to provide:  
 
[T]he legal cover needed to overcome law-induced 
bureaucratic risk-aversion . . . [and the] OLC would 
have been of little help to the Bush II White House 
without someone in the office willing and able to 
write clear and forceful opinions supporting the 
President’s aggressive counterterrorism program.  By 
an accident of fate, . . . John Yoo—was sitting in OLC 
on September 11.
103
 
 
As Goldsmith later explained to a conference hosted by the 
Army Judge Advocate General School, when he began his tenure at 
the OLC he, thought that the issue of how to advise the Executive 
                                                          
100 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT 
INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 35 (2007) (emphasis added). 
101 Id. at 78. 
102 Id. at 33–34. 
103 Id. at 96–97. 
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Branch was “a simple matter.”
104
  In describing his view of the OLC 
and his role as head of the OLC: 
 
I testified to this effect at my confirmation hearings—
that I was simply going to provide good faith, 
impartial legal advice.  I was influenced by one of my 
predecessors, William Barr . . . . This was my attitude 
going in, and I think it’s a good attitude to have going 
in.  But as soon as I got there, I realized this attitude 
was too simple.
105
 
  
Goldsmith asserted that the government lawyer’s advice to the 
President is political.  
 
This doesn’t mean that you’re supposed to be 
political, and it doesn’t mean you can be an advocate 
in the same sense that you would if you were a private 
attorney advising a client.  Rather, it means that the 
lawyer is a member of an Executive Branch and is not 
neutral to the President’s or to the commander’s 
agenda when advising him or her on a legal matter.  
Unlike a court that often just says “no” or “yes,” I 
never said “no” to any of my superiors without trying 
to find a way to help them find a way to achieve their 
desired ends within the law.
106
 
 
Goldsmith found agreement with John Yoo that the role of the OLC, 
not differing from the role of any executive branch attorney, is to 
provide the Executive Branch with a legal avenue to achieve its 
desired goals.  According to Goldsmith, the President should be 
given every legal benefit of the doubt as to the law when addressing a 
legal policy posed by him;
107
 and, in regard to counterterrorism 
policy after September 11th, the “President had to do what he had to 
                                                          
104 Jack Goldsmith, The Third Annual Solf-Warren Lecture in 
International and Operational Law: Reflections on Government Lawyering, 205 
MIL. L. REV. 192, 195 (2010). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 196. 
107 Id. 
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do to protect the country.  And the lawyers had to find some way to 
make what he did legal.”
108
  
Another way to view the debate on the role of government 
attorneys in providing legal advice is the public choice versus public 
interest approaches.  Public choice is a type of rational choice law 
and economics’ theory.  The rational choice theory views human 
interactions in economic terms meaning that in a world of scarce 
resources in which there is not enough for all to share to each 
person’s satisfaction, all those interested in securing a scarce resource 
will maximize his or her accumulation of the resource to the 
detriment of others if necessary.
109
  Public choice theory, as applied 
to our discussion proposes that the “President competes with other 
branches of government, and other actors within the executive 
branch, over the scarce good of determining government policy.  A 
lawyer, as the faithful agent of her client, seeks to advance her 
client’s interests through any lawful means.”
110
  The scarce good is 
the power and ability to control government policy-making.  The 
Private Lawyer model is one example of the public choice theory 
because the focus is not on the law but on maximizing the client’s 
achievement of a scarce resource short of illegal activity.  As 
Professor Wendel observed: 
 
[T]he public choice approach . . . denies that lawyers 
can have any genuine obligation of fidelity to law . . . . 
If it is possible to act lawlessly and get away with it, 
lawyers have no duty to advise their client against that 
course of action and, indeed, if it is in the client’s 
interests, the lawyer may have a duty to assist the 
client.
111
  
                                                          
108  GOLDSMITH, supra note 100, at 81 (emphasis added). 
109 For example, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (1994).  For examples of the application of rational 
choice theory to law, see Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading 
of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982) and David Cole, 
The Poverty of Posner’s Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1735 (2007). 
110 Wendel, supra note 84, at 1341. 
111 Id. at 1349. 
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. . . [T]hat the lawyer’s role is primarily to be 
understood with reference to client interests, with the 
law understood as nothing more than an obstacle 
standing in the way of their clients’ ends.
112
 
 
Although it could be argued that Professor Wendel may be 
overstating his point, he is correct that, under the Public Choice 
model, the best view of the law is not a scarce resource maximizing 
approach.  In contrast, the Public Interest model does provide a 
framework for applying the Barr Doctrine and the Neutral Expositor 
model.  
 In Shakespeare’s famous play Henry VI, Dick the Butcher 
responds to Jack Cade’s ideal—to provide for all of the needs of the 
people, relieving them of the need for money, so they can live in 
perfect harmony—with the famous phrase, “[t]he first thing we do, 
let’s kill all the lawyers.”
113
  Leaving aside whether this famous 
quote is a joke—that to have a peaceful and happy society, the first 
group that must go is the legal profession or, alternatively, a subtle 
warning that before establishing a societal utopia (an imposed 
uniform equality—as determined by the king—among all in which 
individuality is abandoned) one must destroy the legal profession 
which protects individualism and uses the law to shield society from 
the raw power of government, either observation is a comment on the 
role of attorneys and whose interests they serve—those of the 
individual or those of society as a whole.
114
  The latter raises the 
                                                          
112 Id. at 1350. 
113 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE 
SIXTH act 2, sc. 2. 
114 The idea that the attorney has an obligation to serve society as a whole 
and the interests of society was famously advocated by Charles Huston, Vice-Dean 
of the Howard Law School, who is often quoted as saying to his students: 
 
A lawyer’s either a social engineer or he’s a parasite on society    
. . . A social engineer [is] a highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive 
lawyer who [understands] the Constitution of the United States 
and [knows] how to explore its uses in the solving of [the] 
problems of . . . local communities and in ‘bettering conditions of 
the underprivileged citizens.’ 
 
ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF LAW, HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://www.law.howard.edu/19 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).  See also GENNA RAE 
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question: should an attorney serve the public interest above the 
interests of his or her client, or in the case of government attorneys 
(or the OLC), those interests of the President?  This is not an 
academic or philosophical issue for a debate class, it matters what 
those in power think the rule of law means in practical application in 
times of stress and political pressure.
115
  During the Justice 
                                                          
MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS 84 (1983).  See also; Charles Hamilton Houston: Legal Social 
Engineer for a Just Society, INFO OF ARTIST BIOGRAPHY (Aug. 1, 2010, 12:42 PM), 
http://american-biography.blogspot.com/2010/08/charles-hamilton-houston-legal-
social.html.  
115 Intestinal fortitude matters in government when one must stand for 
something.  After the midnight confrontation between the White House attorneys 
and the Department of Justice attorneys in Ashcroft’s room, in which Ashcroft had 
stared down the White House staff (suffering from gallstone pancreatitis) almost 
flat on his back and sending them back without his signature, a beleaguered 
Ashcroft looked at Mueller and said, “Bob, I don’t know what’s happening,” and 
Mueller looked at him and said, “There comes a time in every man’s life when he’s 
tested, and you passed your test tonight.”  GRAFF, infra note 117, at 488.  
In a meeting a day before the midnight hospital incident, Comey attended 
a meeting with V.P. Cheney, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card, Goldsmith 
(head of the OLC), and Deputy Assistant Attorney General (OLC) Patrick Philbin 
to get a briefing from the FBI and National Security Agency on the TSP program in 
which the message to the Department of Justice holdouts was “If the program 
didn’t continue, thousands would die, and it would be Jim Comey’s fault.”  Id. at 
486.  To which Comey told the room, “That’s not helping me” and when he made 
clear that the Yoo memo “analysis is flawed – in fact, fatally flawed.  No lawyer 
reading that could reasonably rely on it” the General Counsel to the Vice President 
David Addington said “well, I’m a lawyer and I did.”  To which Comey answered 
the challenge and said “No good lawyer.”  Id.  
The memo that Comey referred to was the November 2, 2001 memo that 
Yoo submitted to the Attorney General.  In the heavily redacted publically released 
version, Yoo asserted that “FISA only provides a safe harbor for electronic 
surveillance, and cannot restrict the President's ability to engage in warrantless 
searches that protect the national security” and although “FISA purports to be the 
exclusive statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign 
intelligence . . . . Such a reading of FISA would be an unconstitutional 
infringement on the President’s Article II authorities.”  Yoo concluded that “unless 
Congress made a clear statement in FISA that it sought to restrict presidential 
authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area—which it 
has not—then the statute must not be construed to avoid such a reading.”  Yoo then 
asserted that Congress could not place such a restriction on the Article II power of 
the Commander-in-Chief; and, when the president orders such searches in the name 
of national security, he has plenary power to do so because “intelligence gathering 
in direct support of military operations does not trigger constitutional rights against 
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Department dispute with the White House over the TSP program, the 
conflict was not whether the program was a good program or useful 
program; it was a conflict over its legality.
116
  During the conflict, 
FBI Director Bob Mueller played a significant role in settling the 
dispute with the White House acceding to the Justice Department’s 
concerns for the illegality of the program.
117
  Mueller approached the 
dispute by backing Comey and making it clear that his role, as 
director of the FBI, is “to uphold the Justice Department’s 
responsibility for protecting the Constitution” because he “hadn’t 
sworn to serve George W. Bush, [but] he had sworn to protect the 
Constitution from all enemies, foreign and domestic.”
118
 
The Public Interest and the Agency Loyalty models were both 
utilized when the entire senior leadership of the Department of 
Justice, including Ashcroft and Mueller, were prepared to resign
119
 
                                                          
illegal searches and seizures.”  Yoo asserted that the fourth amendment protection 
against warrantless searches was not absolute, and “a warrantless search can be 
constitutional when special needs, beyond the normal need of law enforcement, 
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractical.”  John Yoo, 
Memorandum to the Attorney General (November 2, 2001) 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/NSA_Wiretapping_OLC_Memo_Nov_2_2001_Yo
o.pdf. 
On May 6, 2004 Goldsmith issued a memo to the Attorney General 
asserting that “the President, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, has 
legal authority to authorize the NSA to conduct the signals-intelligence activities 
described above; that the activities, to the extent they are searches subject to the 
Fourth Amendment, comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment; and 
thus that the operation of the [TSP] program as described above is lawful.”  Jack 
Goldsmith, Memorandum to the Attorney General (May 6, 2004), at 108 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/NSA_Wiretapping_OLC_Memo_May_6_2004_G
oldsmith.pdf.  
Both memos were withdrawn by the OLC.  See Steven Bradbury, 
Memorandum for Files: Re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the 
Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (January 15, 2009) at 6,  
available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf.  
116 See supra notes 40–52; GRAFF, infra note 117.  When President Bush 
met with Mueller two days after the midnight hospital incident, “Mueller refused to 
budge from his position.  The Stellar Wind program [TSP] as instituted was illegal.  
Simple as that.”  Id. at 493. 
117 GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX: THE FBI AT WAR IN THE 
AGE OF GLOBAL TERROR 490–91 (2011). 
118 Id. at 491 and 493 respectively. 
119 Id. at 489; supra notes 40–52. 
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when the President signed the reauthorization of a program that had 
been determined to be illegal.  Ashcroft and Comey had determined 
after a meeting on March 4, 2004 that to do otherwise would expose 
the Department to “tremendous dangers” by making it “knowingly 
complicit in active lawbreaking.  Given the Department’s—and the 
FBI’s—mandate, to do so would constitute a fundamental sort of 
corruption.”
120
  The Agency Loyalty model allowed for the entire 
senior leadership of the Department of Justice to threaten resignation 
because the role of their agency, protection of the rule of law, was 
directly attacked and they were bound to defend their agency; and the 
Public Interest model allowed them to act because the higher public 
interest was the law, not the administration’s policy.  As Director 
Mueller stated in a speech before the American Civil Liberties Union 
on June 13, 2003, less than a year before the dispute came to a 
climax, 
 
[t]he FBI puts a premium on thoroughly training our 
Special Agents about their responsibility to respect the 
rights and dignity of individuals.  In addition to 
extensive instruction on Constitutional law, criminal 
procedure, and sensitivity to other cultures, every new 
FBI Agent makes a visit to the Holocaust museum to 
see for themselves what happens when law 
enforcement becomes a tool for oppression. 
We live in dangerous times, but we are not the 
first generation of Americans to face threats to our 
security.  Like those before us, we will be judged by 
future generations on how we react to this crisis.  And 
by that I mean not just whether we win the war on 
terrorism, because I believe we will, but also whether, 
as we fight that war, we safeguard for our citizens the 
very liberties for which we are fighting. 
. . .  
                                                          
120 GRAFF, supra note 117, at 485.  The Administration lead by President 
Bush and Vice President Cheney viewed the program differently than the Justice 
Department in that “the administration viewed the surveillance program as a 
necessity for the nation’s security; Mueller felt just the opposite: The nation’s 
security rested with its primacy of law . . . . If President Bush didn’t change course, 
Mueller had no choice, he said.”  Id. at 493. 
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. . . the FBI will live up to its obligation to protect the 
citizens of the United States as well as the rights 
afforded to each citizen under our Constitution . . . . 
 
. . . But in fighting terrorists, we seek to prevent the 
“tyranny of the minority” from destroying our 
fundamental way of life.  The FBI will be judged not 
just on how we effectively disrupt and deter terrorism, 
but also on how we protect the civil liberties and the 
Constitutional rights of all Americans, including those 
who wish us ill.  We must accomplish both, so that 
future generations can enjoy lives that are both “safe” 
and “free.”  The FBI is dedicated to protecting 
Americans, and America’s freedoms, and we will.
121
 
 
The Public Interest model is an alternative to the Private 
Lawyer model by emphasizing that the role of the attorney, in 
general, and (for the present discussion) the role of the Attorney 
General and the OLC, is to serve the public good or, at the very least, 
the interests of the institution of the Presidency and the national 
government, not the specific individual holding the Office of the 
Presidency.
122
  As General Bell observed in his remarks regarding the 
role of government attorneys: “Although our client is the 
government, in the end we serve a more important constituency: the 
American people.”
123
  The Public Interest model requires the 
Attorney General and the OLC to answer a President’s request for the 
interpretation of the law with the best view of the law, not with the 
answer the President would like to receive, because the interests of 
the Attorney General and the OLC are institutional not individual.
124
  
It is granted that, even under this rubric, the most honest lawyers 
would disagree on the resolution of specific legal questions, but the 
point is that the goal under the Public Interest model is functionally 
and normatively different than the Private Lawyer model in which 
                                                          
121 Robert Mueller, Address to the American Civil Liberties Union 2003 
Inaugural Membership Conference Washington, DC (June 13, 2003), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/protecting-americans-against-terrorism.  
122 See supra notes 17, 53, 55, 59–63 and accompanying text. 
123 Bell, supra note 22, at 1069. 
124 See supra notes 17, 53, 55, 59–63 and accompanying text. 
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the goal to be reached is the one held by the client.  The Public 
Interest model is not defined by the specific legal conclusions 
reached but by the process and goal of focusing on the law above 
politics; for doing so maintains the elevation of the principle of the 
rule of law over the rule by law.
125
 
The Public Interest model approach was advocated by Dawn 
Johnsen, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the OLC (1997–
1998)
126
 and OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Clinton 
Administration (1993–1996), in a memo addressed to Attorney 
General Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzalez (White House Counsel) and 
Daniel Levin (Acting Assistant Attorney General for OLC) on 
December 21, 2004 after the OLC August 2002 Memo on 
interrogation had been released.
127
  The memo listed ten guiding 
principles on OLC legal opinion writing.  The first principle correctly 
rejected the Private Lawyer model and supported the Barr Doctrine 
and Neutral Expositor model for providing opinions to the 
President.
128
  It is not contended that the memo does not reflect a 
political agenda of the signors of the document
129
 or bias against the 
                                                          
125 Id.  See also Garrison, supra note 82. 
126 Ms. Johnsen was nominated to be the Assistant Attorney General for 
the OLC by President Obama in January 2009 and, although being positively 
reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in March 2009, her nomination 
received significant Republican opposition due to her positions on abortion and the 
Bush post-September 11th policies which resulted in failure to schedule a final 
Senate vote.  Johnsen withdrew her nomination in April 2010. 
127 Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal 
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007). 
128  Id. at 1604. 
 
When providing legal advice to guide contemplated executive 
branch action, OLC should provide an accurate and honest 
appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice will constrain the 
administration’s pursuit of desired policies.  The advocacy model 
of lawyering, in which lawyers craft merely plausible legal 
arguments to support their clients’ desired actions, inadequately 
promotes the President’s constitutional obligation to ensure the 
legality of executive action.  
 
Id. (italics removed). 
129 All of the signatories were members of the OLC during the Clinton 
Administration.  
    
Fall 2012 The Role of the OLC After September 11th  693 
work of the Bush Administration OLC,
130
 but that the memo is 
correct that the OLC opinions should reflect the best view of the law 
and should be provided with the fidelity to the law and not primarily 
to the interests of the President.  
A final approach to how government attorneys should 
approach legal advising is called the Critical Analysis model.
131
  This 
approach supplements the Public Interest model by observing that 
attorneys have significant input in policy determinations and strategic 
planning by the nature of the fact that government agencies seek to 
act within the law.
132
  Thus, the best view of the law, reflecting the 
public interest values of the rule of law prevailing over policy when 
the two are in conflict, is implemented by the process in which “the 
government lawyer draws on the numerous sources from which the 
public interest can be extrapolated to help the agency define its 
position in light of those values.”
133
  
The role of opinion writing first established by the Attorney 
General and then transferred to the OLC is not equivalent to the role 
of the private lawyer providing advice to his client.  The OLC has a 
public interest to protect, which private and other government 
attorneys do not share.  The history of legal opinion writing within 
the Executive Branch has a higher purpose than simply securing an 
                                                          
130 For example, after providing the first principle, the memo explains as 
follows: 
 
To fulfill this function appropriately, OLC must provide advice 
based on its best understanding of what the law requires.  OLC 
should not simply provide an advocate’s best defense of 
contemplated action that OLC actually believes is best viewed as 
unlawful.  To do so would deprive the President and other 
executive branch decisionmakers of critical information and, 
worse, mislead them regarding the legality of contemplated 
action. 
 
Id.  Notice the assumption in the second sentence that “OLC should not simply 
provide an advocate’s best defense of contemplated action that OLC actually 
believes is best viewed as unlawful,” clearly implying that OLC knew the advice 
that Yoo and Barbee provided was unlawful but decided to provide the 
administration with its best argument on how to sustain an “unlawful” act.   
131 Note, supra note 95, at 1182. 
132 Id. at 1176. 
133 Id. at 1186. 
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answer to a legal question.  The purpose is to aid the Office of the 
President to faithfully execute the laws.
134
  This responsibility can be 
implemented through various models on the role of government 
attorneys. The Barr Doctrine and the Neutral Expositor models 
provide a context for the Public Interest and the Critical Analysis 
models; all of which provide a framework for reaching the same 
objective, the rule of law over politics and policy.  The institution of 
legal opinion writing under the authority of the Attorney General is 
separate and above the role as cabinet officer and political 
subordinate to the President. The Barr Doctrine, the Neutral 
Expositor model, the Public Interest model, and the Critical Analysis 
model applied to executive legal opinion writing protect the principle 
of the rule of law and the OLC obligation to get correct what the law 
rules.  It is when the OLC abandons this role for that of the private 
lawyer or policy advocate that errors are made.   
 
 III.  THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, THE OLC, THE JAGS AND THE WAR 
ON TERROR: WHERE POLICY AND LAW INTERACTED 
 
Lord Young: We were showing that 
this is not a state where the rule of law 
counts for nothing, and where a 
member of the security services can 
appoint themself as an executioner. 
Harry: Well, I hope you remember that 
pious bullshit the next time there’s a 
terrorist outrage on these shores. 
Lord Young: I hope you remember that 
a democracy is not only protected with 
guns.
135
 
 
It is a truism that a democracy is not only protected by guns, 
but is protected even more by the rule of law and what the rule of law 
protects.  Not since the attacks of December 7, 1941 had the United 
States suffered a major attack on its shores, and in the very first 
                                                          
134 Garrison, supra note 2; Barr, supra note 17; Comey, supra note 55; 
Moss, supra note 59. 
135 BBC TV Series MI-5 Persephone Season 3, Episode 6 (November 15, 
2004), available at http://www.tv.com/shows/spooks-uk/episode-6-375582/. 
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national security meeting after the attacks of 9/11, General Ashcroft 
summarized a key policy determination by the Bush 
Administration—that the goal was to make sure they never happen 
again.
136
  The Bush Administration approached the attacks with two 
policy determinations: first, that they were acts of war and not 
international criminal acts;
137
 and second, it was the policy of the 
national government, law enforcement, and intelligence institutions 
to prevent a second occurrence of the attacks.
138
  One of the resulting 
policy initiatives was the determination that the administration would 
not approach the capturing of those who participated and planned the 
                                                          
136 JOHN ASHCROFT, NEVER AGAIN: SECURING AMERICA AND RESTORING 
JUSTICE 133 (2006). 
137 President Bush in his State of the Union Address on January 20, 2004 
made clear: 
 
As we gather tonight, hundreds of thousands of 
American service men and women are deployed across the world 
in the war on terror.  By bringing hope to the oppressed and 
delivering justice to the violent, they are making America more 
secure.  
. . . .  
America is on the offensive against the terrorists who 
started this war. . . . 
 . . . .  
Many of our troops are listening tonight.  And I want 
you and your families to know: America is proud of you.  And 
my administration and this Congress will give you the resources 
you need to fight and win the war on terror. 
. . . . 
I know that some people question if America is really in 
a war at all.  They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to 
be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments. 
. . . .  
After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is 
not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers.  The terrorists 
and their supporters declared war on the United States.  And war 
is what they got.  
 
Text of President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union Address, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 
2004), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html 
[hereinafter State of the Union Address]. 
138 ASHCROFT, supra note 136; YOO, supra note 98; Mueller, supra note 
121. 
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attacks with a law enforcement perspective—i.e. by bringing them 
before the bar of justice—but the purpose of capture was 
interrogating and gathering actionable intelligence to prevent future 
attacks.
139
  There is a difference between the gathering of evidence 
for trial and the gathering of intelligence in war, and the differences 
in purpose and techniques between them are legitimate but are almost 
always mutually exclusive.  General Ashcroft made this clear when 
he said at the first national security meeting that if we don’t go to 
trial, so be it.
140
  
The initial problem with the Bush policy after 9/11 was that 
the nation, as a whole, was not totally convinced that the attacks were 
acts of war and should be handled as such.
141
  But more importantly, 
the problem that the Bush Administration created for itself was that, 
after declaring that the attacks were acts of war and would be treated 
as such, it determined that the rules of war—as understood by the 
international, academic, and uniformed armed forces’ legal 
communities—did not apply.
142
  If the attackers of 9/11, and those 
who helped in the planning and operation of it, had committed war, 
how could they be detained and questioned (interrogated) outside of 
the Geneva Convention and its protections?  The answer to this 
question is not insignificant because, since the end of World War II, 
the nature of war has changed to include the reduction of civilian 
casualties as a primary military and legal obligation of all nations.  
More importantly, with the advent of international treaties, the 
international human rights movement (and supporting organizations) 
and international judicial bodies designed to govern the dogs of war 
and enforce the role of the law in the operational aspect of war have 
become significant aspects of planning by line military officers.  This 
application of law as a part of warfare has come to be called 
“lawfare;” and, in the U.S. military, lawfare has resulted in the 
increased significance of the armed forces’ Judge Advocates General 
                                                          
139 ASHCROFT, supra note 136. 
140 Id. at 133. 
141 President Bush acknowledged as much in his 2004 State of the Union 
Address: “I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all.  
They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law 
enforcement and indictments.”  See State of the Union Address, supra note 137. 
142 See supra notes 3, 7–10 and infra Part III. 
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(JAGs).
143
  This aspect of the legalization of warfare was part of the 
explanation for the dispute over the OLC opinions between the OLC 
and JAGs.
144
  The Bush Administration policy of asserting that the 
Geneva Convention protections did not apply to those captured 
during the war on terror was defended with the assertion that the war 
on terrorism—though a war and not a criminal matter for the 
courts—was a different type of war;
145
 and thus, the Geneva 
Convention did not apply as commonly understood in post World 
War II conflicts like Korea, Vietnam,
146
 or the first Gulf War.  The 
                                                          
143 Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the 
Military: A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1815 (2007). 
144 Id.  
145 Sulmasy and Yoo write that this difference is significant both in 
understanding the nature of the attacks of 9/11 and in the civilian/military 
relationship over war policy.  They write: 
 
Another cause of different preferences is the nature of the fight 
against al Qaeda.  The United States continues to justify its 
policies with principles embodied in the laws of war.  These 
rules, however, were drafted primarily to deal with two types of 
armed conflict—wars between nation-states, and internal civil 
wars.  The September 11th attacks introduced a different type of 
armed conflict, one between a nation-state and an international 
terrorist organization with international reach and the ability to 
inflict levels of destruction previously only in the hands of states.  
Claims of deference to military expertise will not prove as 
compelling to civilians when the rules of warfare are being 
adapted to a new situation. 
 
Id. at 1835 (internal citations omitted). 
146 Vietnam was a significant point in the history of the JAGs in 
operational warfare involvement due to the nature of the war, the blurring of battle 
lines, identification of the enemy, the nature in which the military engaged the war, 
and the nature of the loss of the war.  As Sulmasy and Yoo explain: 
 
The American experience in Vietnam changed perceptions of the 
role of law in warfare.  The Vietnam War raised novel tactical 
and legal issues . . . This experience, where lawlessness and legal 
complexities impacted combat operations, encouraged the 
increased involvement of JAGs in wartime decisions.  The 
Vietnam environment blurred the line between civilian and 
enemy fighters, and the law of armed conflict became 
increasingly difficult to apply in combat situations.  
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war on terror was not like these conventional wars, and the rules 
governing such conflicts did not apply to the like of al Qaeda. 
Leaving aside the policy aspects of this assertion, as a legal 
matter the answer failed to convince significant parts of the 
Executive Branch’s legal community,
147
 especially the uniformed 
                                                          
In addition, the media was now reporting on the conduct 
of the war . . . .  
. . . The unpopular war and relative shock of witnessing 
the brutal nature of warfare itself created increased concern as to 
the Armed Forces’ conduct in warfare. . . . . 
This concern with the lawfulness of combat operations 
by the U.S. military was highlighted by the singular case of 
Lieutenant William Calley and the atrocity that occurred at My 
Lai in March 1968 . . . .  
. . . This incident, coupled with the emerging emphasis 
on the law of armed conflict, led to a variety of investigations by 
both civilian and military leaders.  One problem was evident to 
the investigators: The United States maintained a woefully 
inadequate training program for soldiers on the laws of war.  As a 
result, the Department of Defense placed primary responsibility 
for this training on JAGs.  This new role provided military 
lawyers their first entrée into impacting war fighting and 
promoting adherence to the laws of armed conflict.  
Subsequent conflicts in Grenada, Panama, and the 
Persian Gulf continued to transform the role of JAGs.  By the 
1990s, JAGs became an intimate part of operational advice to 
combatant commanders.  In the Kosovo campaign, JAGs were an 
integral component of the decisionmaking process in military 
operations.  JAGs were now teaching the laws of war to all 
members of the Armed Forces, performing mission and 
operational legal analysis, actively participating in war games, 
drafting (rather than merely advising on) rules of engagement, 
participating in the targeting process, and even reviewing battle 
plans and orders.  As a direct result, JAGs are now found at every 
layer of the command structure. 
 
Id. at 1839–41 (internal citations omitted). 
147 See, e.g., Alberto J. Mora, Memorandum for Inspector General, 
Department of the Navy, Statement for the Record: Office of General Counsel 
Involvement in Interrogation Issues (June 18, 2004) [hereinafter Mora Memo]; 
Colin Powell, Counsel to the President Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the 
Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 
2002); William H. Taft IV, General Counsel to the President, Comments on your 
paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2, 2002); see also Alberto Gonzales, White 
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military justice community.
148
  The JAGs provided the Bush 
Administration DOD Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and 
                                                          
House General Counsel to the President, Decision Re: Application of the Geneva 
Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 
25, 2002) (provided President Bush with a summary of the arguments that 
Secretary Powel and William Taft made against the OLC memos asserting the 
Geneva Convention did not apply to captured al Qaeda and Taliban fighters; 
President Bush affirmed the OLC); President George W. Bush, Memorandum on 
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002).   
148 The uniform Judge Advocates General voiced various concerns 
regarding the opinions of the OLC and the general issue of not applying the Geneva 
Convention to captured detainees.  For example, Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Brigadier 
General, USMC, Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, Marine Corp, wrote to 
the General Counsel of the Air Force: 
 
1. In addition to comments we submitted 5 February, we 
concur with the recommendations submitted by the Navy (TJAG 
RADM Lohr), the Air Force (TJAG MGen Rives), and the Joint 
Staff Legal Counsel's Office.  Their recommendations dealt with 
policy considerations, contention with the OLC opinion, and 
foreign interpretations of GC IV (Civilians) and customary 
international law, respectively. 
2. The common thread among our recommendations is 
concern for service members.  OLC does not represent the 
services; thus, understandably, concern for service members is 
not reflected in their opinion.  Notably, their opinion is silent on 
the UCMJ and foreign views of international law. 
. . . . 
. . . When assessing whether to use exceptional 
interrogation techniques, consideration should be given to the 
possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed Forces culture and self-
image which suffered during the Vietnam conflict and at other 
times due to perceived law of war violations.  DOD policy 
indoctrinated in the DOD Law of War Program in 1979 and 
subsequent service regulations, greatly restored the culture and 
self-image of U.S. Armed Forces by establishing high 
benchmarks of compliance with the principles and spirit of the 
law of war and humane treatment of all persons in U.S. Armed 
Forces custody.  In addition, consideration should be given to 
whether implementation of such techniques is likely to result in 
adverse impacts for DOD personnel who are captured or 
detained [become POWs], including possible perceptions by 
other nations that the United States is lowering standards related 
to the treatment of prisoners and other detainees, generally. 
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Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the 
U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism
149
 with their own legal 
analysis of the OLC opinions and the obligations that the U.S. had 
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the 
Geneva Conventions.
150
  Rumsfeld ordered the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD) General Counsel to establish the working group to 
review all of the pertinent issues relating to the interrogation of 
detainees held by the U.S. Armed Forces on January 15, 2003.
151
  
The working group was chaired by the General Counsel of the Air 
Force.
152
  The order was issued after the General Counsel of the 
Navy, Alberto J. Mora, threatened to issue a legal opinion that some 
of the eighteen methods approved by Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002 
“constituted cruel and unusual treatment or torture and that use of the 
techniques would violate domestic and international law.”  (This 
prompted Rumsfeld to resend the December 2, 2002 approval memo 
on January 15, 2003).
153
 
General Jack L. Rives, Major General, U.S. Air Force, 
Deputy Judge Advocate General, in a memo to the General Counsel 
of the Air Force, commented on the practical impact of informing the 
military that the Geneva Convention does not apply to interrogations 
                                                          
Memorandum for General Counsel of the Air Force, Working Group 
Recommendations on Detainee Interrogations 1–2 (Feb. 27, 2003).  Italics in 
original show wording that General Sandkuhler recommended be placed in the 
DOD WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION IN THE GLOBAL 
WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND 
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS DRAFT REPORT (Mar. 6, 2003).  The final report 
was released April 4, 2003.  Both reports are reprinted in KAREN J. GREENBERG, 
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua 
L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].   
149 DOD WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION IN THE 
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND 
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS DRAFT REPORT (Mar. 6, 2003). 
150 Id. 
151 THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 148, at 238. 
152 Id. at 240. 
153 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DRAFT 
REPORT, (U) INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA 
ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF 
“ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 48 (2008); 
see also DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 
17 (David Cole ed., 2009); Mora Memo, supra note 147, at 14–15. 
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of captured enemy combatants.  His concern was that legal 
distinctions have consequences.  He wrote:  
 
While the detainees’ status as unlawful belligerents 
may not entitle them to protections of the Geneva 
Conventions, that is a legal distinction that may be 
lost on the members of the armed forces.  Approving 
exceptional interrogation techniques may be seen as 
giving official approval and legal sanction to the 
application of interrogation techniques that U.S. 
Armed Forces have heretofore been trained are 
unlawful .
 
. . .  
General use of exceptional techniques 
(generally, having substantially greater risk than those 
currently, routinely used by U.S. Armed Forces 
interrogators), even though lawful, may create 
uncertainty among interrogators regarding the 
appropriate limits of interrogations, and may 
adversely affect the cultural self-image of the U.S. 
armed forces.
154
 
 
Thomas J. Romig, Major General, U.S. Army, Judge 
Advocate General, was blunt in his criticism of the logic of the OLC 
legal advice to the DOD.  He wrote to the General Counsel of the Air 
Force: 
 
3. (U) While the OLC analysis speaks to a 
number of defenses that could be raised on behalf of 
those who engage in interrogation techniques later 
perceived to be illegal, the “bottom line” defense 
proffered by OLC is an exceptionally broad concept of 
“necessity.”  This defense is based upon the premise 
that any existing federal statutory provision or 
international obligation is unconstitutional per se, 
where it otherwise prohibits conduct viewed by the 
                                                          
154 Memorandum for SAF/GC from AF/JA, Comments on Draft Report 
and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and 
Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed 
Forces in the War on Terrorism 1–2 (Feb. 6, 2003). 
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President, acting in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief, as essential to his capacity to wage war.  I 
question whether this theory would ultimately prevail 
in either the U.S. courts or in any international forum.  
If such a defense is not available, soldiers ordered to 
use otherwise illegal techniques run a substantial risk 
of criminal prosecution or personal liability arising 
from a civil lawsuit. 
4. (U) The OLC opinion states further that 
customary international law cannot bind the U.S. 
Executive Branch as it is not part of the federal law.  
As such, any presidential decision made in the context 
of the ongoing war on terrorism constitutes a 
“controlling” Executive act; one that immediately and 
automatically displaces any contrary provision of 
customary international law.  This view runs contrary 
to the historic position taken by the United States 
Government concerning such laws and, in our 
opinion, could adversely impact DOD interests 
worldwide.  On the one hand, such a policy will open 
us to international criticism that the “U.S. is a law 
unto itself.”  On the other, implementation of 
questionable techniques will very likely establish a 
new baseline for acceptable practice in this area, 
putting our service personnel at far greater risk and 
vitiating many of the POW/detainee safeguards the 
U.S. has worked hard to establish over the past five 
decades.
155
 
 
The JAGs concurred that there were serious policy as well as 
legal
156
 errors and ramifications to the OLC opinions.
157
  They all 
                                                          
155Memorandum for General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force, 
Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, 
Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the 
U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism 1 (Mar. 3, 2003) [hereinafter March 3, 
2003 Memorandum], available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf. 
156 Michael F. Lohr, Rear Admiral, JAGC, U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate 
General, who took issue with the draft report conclusion (echoing the August 2002 
Memo) that if a detainee was harmed during an interrogation he could claim that it 
was done to prevent another Al Qaeda attack.  Admiral Lohr informed the 
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Secretary of the Air Force that “this sentence is not true.”  March 3, 2003 
Memorandum, supra note 155, at 1. Admiral Lohr asserted: 
 
There are domestic limits on the President’s power to interrogate 
prisoners.  One of them is Congress's advice and consent to the 
US ratification to the Geneva Conventions that limit the 
interrogation of POWs.  The willingness of the Executive, and of 
the Legislative Branch, to enforce those restrictions is a different 
matter. 
 
March 3, 2003 Memorandum, supra note 155, at 1. 
157 See generally Mora Memo, supra note 147.  General Rives concluded 
in an opinion to the Air Force Judge Advocate General that  
 
1. (U) In drafting the subject report and 
recommendations, the legal opinions of the Department of 
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (DoJ/OLC), were relied on 
almost exclusively.  Although the opinions of DoJ/OLC are to be 
given a great deal of weight within the Executive Branch, their 
positions on several of the Working Group’s issues are 
contentious.  As our discussion demonstrate, others within and 
outside the Executive Branch are likely to disagree . . . .  
2. (U) Several of the more extreme interrogation 
techniques, on their face, amount to violations of domestic 
criminal law and the UCMJ (e.g., assault).  Applying the more 
extreme techniques during the interrogation of detainees places 
the interrogators and the chain of command at risk of criminal 
accusations domestically.  Although a wide range of defenses to 
these accusations theoretically apply, it is impossible to be 
certain that any defense will be successful at trial; our domestic 
courts may well disagree with DoJ/OLC’s interpretation of the 
law.  Further, while the current administration is not likely to 
pursue prosecution, it is impossible to predict how future 
administrations will view the use of such techniques.   
3. (U) Additionally, other nations are unlikely to agree 
with DoJ/OLC’s interpretation of the law in some instances.  
Other nations may disagree with the President’s status 
determination regarding the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 
(OEF) detainees; they may conclude that the detainees are POWs 
entitled to all of the protections of the Geneva Conventions.  
Treating OEF detainees inconsistently with the Conventions 
arguably “lowers the bar” for the treatment of U.S. POWs in 
future conflicts.  Even where nations agree with the President’s 
status determination, many would view the more extreme 
interrogation techniques as violative of other international law 
(other treaties or customary international law) and perhaps 
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warned that the use of enhanced techniques, and the policy initiatives 
that placed limits on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, 
reduced the self-image of the U.S. military, lowered the bar on the 
standards of treatment of the enemy in times of war, opened the 
military to possible prosecution in both domestic and international 
courts due to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and 
placed captured American military personnel at risk of torture by the 
enemy due to the American policy of weakened observance of the 
Geneva Convention standards regarding its treatment of captured 
enemy combatants.
158
  
The opinions of the uniformed armed forces legal community 
did not prevail
159
 in part because the OLC opinions were considered 
dispositive on both the applicability of the CAT and the Geneva 
Convention to the question of the definition of and the use of 
enhanced interrogation and the power of the President to determine 
the treatment of captured enemy combatants.  The civilian 
policymakers in the Pentagon provided a final report to Secretary 
Rumsfeld, Final Report and Recommendations of the Working Group 
to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Relating to 
                                                          
violative of their own domestic law.  This puts the interrogators 
and the chain of command at risk of criminal accusations abroad, 
either in foreign domestic courts or in international fora, to 
include the ICC. 
 
Memorandum for SAF/GC from AF/JA, Final Report and Recommendations of the 
Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Relating to 
Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism 
1 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf.  
158 See supra notes 147–48, 154–57; infra notes 159, 161 and 
accompanying text. 
159 The opinion of the JAGs did not prevail, in no small part, as a result of 
the OLC advice and its publication of the Military Interrogations Memo which 
supported the techniques in Rumsfeld’s December 2002 memo.  The working 
Group developed its policy recommendations between January 18 and 29, 2003 and 
“during this period, OLC delivered its draft legal memo on interrogation techniques 
[and] contributions from the members of the Working Group, including OGC, 
began to be rejected if they did not conform to the OLC guidance.”  See Mora 
Memo, supra note 147, at 16–18.  The process was such that because the OLC 
opinion was considered binding “it became evident to me and my OCG colleagues 
that the Working Group report being assembled would contain profound mistakes 
in its legal analysis, in large measure because of its reliance on the flawed OLC 
memo.”  Id.  
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Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War 
on Terrorism (April 4, 2003), which approved thirty-five techniques 
that could be used by the military personnel.
160
  They included many 
of the same techniques authorized by the August 2002 Memo, CIA 
Interrogation, and Military Interrogation opinions.  General Rives, 
Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, warned of the 
political ramifications of the OLC opinions and the techniques being 
approved by the DOD.  He warned: 
 
Should any information concerning the exceptional 
techniques become public, it is likely to be 
exaggerated/distorted in both the U.S. and 
international media.  This could have a negative 
impact on international, and perhaps even domestic, 
support for the war on terrorism.  It could likewise 
have a negative impact on public perception of the 
U.S. military in general.
161
 
 
This is exactly what happened.  The Abu Ghraib scandal along with 
the leaking of the OLC August 2002 Memo forever blackened the 
policy arguments made by the Bush Administration that it was in 
compliance with the rule of law and that the war on terror was 
different.  The Abu Ghraib and the later GITMO abuse scandals gave 
evidence to those who asserted that the U.S. had outright authorized 
torture and other inhuman tactics in violation of international law and 
that the U.S. was acting as a law unto itself.
162
  This was the exact 
reaction the uniformed armed forces legal community warned would 
happen.  The Bush Administration thereafter battled the narrative that 
it had sacrificed the law, and the rule of law, on the altar of American 
                                                          
160 See THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 148, at 340–43.  See also 
JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
105–06 (2006). 
161 Memorandum for SAF/GC from AF/JA, Comments on Draft Report 
and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and 
Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed 
Forces in the War on Terrorism (Feb. 6, 2003), available at 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf.  
162 Garrison, supra note 9. 
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fears and the arrogant desire to make policy unilaterally in the name 
of providing security for America.
163
 
As Benjamin Franklin observed, a nation that trades freedom 
and liberty for security will lose both and deserves neither.
164
  A 
republic maintains freedom and liberty, in times of war and national 
security crisis, by maintaining and defending the rule of law, which 
involves interpreting the law correctly.
165
  The rule of law is a 
principle in which all segments of society, including the government, 
is subservient to the dictates of the law, and the law should be 
consulted and adhered to in all policy matters.
166
  But “failing to 
follow the rule of law” is not synonymous with failure to apply what 
the law rules correctly.
167
  More importantly, the rule of law does not 
require action or inaction based on what people want the law to rule 
when it doesn’t.
168
  The error by the OLC was not that the rule of law 
was not honored.  The rule of law is honored when the OLC is sought 
to provide a legal opinion on a proposed policy.  The error was not 
that the OLC got the law (the meaning of Section 2340) wrong in the 
August 2002 Memo but that the approach of the memo was an 
abandonment of the traditional Neutral Expositor of the best view of 
the law as advocated by General Barr and others for the Private 
Lawyer model.
169
 
The OLC proposed legal answers to questions not asked and 
asserted that any law, including a domestic criminal statute outlawing 
torture, was unconstitutional if applied to the Commander-in-Chief 
power of the President in time of war.
170
  Although the OLC and, 
                                                          
163 Id. 
164 Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor 
(Nov. 11, 1755), in THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN VOL. 6, 242 (Leonard W. 
Labaree ed., 1963).  
165 Arthur H. Garrison, The Rule of Law and What the Law Rules: The 
History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions on the Commander-in-Chief Power 
and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Torture and Commander-in-
Chief Opinions During the First Two Years of the Bush Administration after 
September 11 (unpublished doctoral thesis, on file with the Northeastern University 
Library system). 
166 Id. 
167 Garrison, supra note 3. 
168 Id. 
169 Garrison, supra notes 3 and 9. 
170 Id.  See also supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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before that, the Attorney General have issued opinions favorable to 
the President in defining the breadth and depth of the Commander-in-
Chief power,
171
 never before had the OLC or the Department of 
Justice made the assertion that the president was not bound to comply 
with a criminal statute because it interfered with his general 
Commander-in-Chief power, not even in the days of World War 
II!
172
  Since Attorney General Bradford advised President 
Washington that he did not have to release diplomatic papers to 
Congress,
173
 and General Bates affirmed the power of President 
Lincoln to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in order to deal with the 
slave owner rebellion in 1861
174
 Attorneys General and the OLC 
have historically protected the inherent powers of the President; but 
the Bush Administration OLC took assertion of presidential power 
during war to a new level.  Even the OLC opinions issued during the 
Nixon Administration, during the expansion of a secret war into 
Cambodia, and those of the Reagan and the First Bush 
Administrations never asserted that domestic criminal law can be 
disregarded by the President.
175
  Even Dellinger’s OLC opinion,
176
 
which proposed there are times when a President can disregard a 
federal statute, never asserted a President could disregard a federal 
criminal statute.  Dellinger did accept that under the Constitution the 
President is obligated to protect his office from encroachments by the 
                                                          
171 Arthur H. Garrison, The History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions 
on the Power of the President as Commander-in-Chief from Washington to Obama, 
43 CUMB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
172 At the height of World War II, the Executive Branch never asserted 
that judicial review of war policy, much less a criminal statute, was beyond judicial 
review.  It should be remembered that it was during World War II that the court 
determined the boundaries of the internment policy and set limits on its 
implementation.  See ARTHUR H. GARRISON, SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN 
TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS, TERRORISM, AND WAR: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
201–35 (2011).  
173 Id. at 266.  
174 Id. at 56–60. 
175 Garrison, supra note 3. 
176 Memorandum for the Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the 
President Re: Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional 
Statutes, 18 OPINION OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNS. 199 (Nov. 2, 1994), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm.  What is interesting is that 
Yoo never cited this opinion for the proposition that the President could disregard 
the prohibition on torture since it impacted on his Commander-in-Chief power. 
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Legislative Branch; and, in doing so, has the authority to make 
independent determinations on what the Constitution requires, 
especially when the dispute is not justiciable in the Supreme Court.  
Dellinger asserted in his memo: 
 
6. The President has enhanced responsibility to 
resist unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon 
the constitutional powers of the Presidency.  Where 
the President believes that an enactment 
unconstitutionally limits his powers, he has the 
authority to defend his office and decline to abide by 
it, unless he is convinced that the Court would 
disagree with his assessment . . . .  
Some legislative encroachments on executive 
authority, however, will not be justiciable or are for 
other reasons unlikely to be resolved in court.  If 
resolution in the courts is unlikely and the President 
cannot look to a judicial determination, he must 
shoulder the responsibility of protecting the 
constitutional role of the presidency.  This is usually 
true, for example, of provisions limiting the 
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief.  Where 
it is not possible to construe such provisions 
constitutionally, the President has the authority to act 
on his understanding of the Constitution.
177
 
 
Dellinger made clear that the President “should presume that 
enactments are constitutional [and] the President should give great 
deference to the fact that Congress passed the statute and that 
Congress believed it was upholding its obligation to enact 
constitutional legislation;”
178
 and, if the President believed the law to 
be unconstitutional, he should declare it as such and submit the law 
to the Supreme Court for final determination.
179
  
                                                          
177 Id. at 201. 
178 Id. at 200. 
179 Dellinger notes:  
 
5.  Where the President’s independent constitutional 
judgment and his determination of the Court’s probable decision 
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IV.  THE OLC, INTRA-EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGAL POLICYMAKING, 
AND WHY IT MATTERS WHAT THE OLC SAYS 
 
Although the OLC holds the institutional and administrative 
authority of being dispositive on questions of law within the 
Executive Branch, this does not mean that there is not inter-agency 
competition for acceptance of those opinions by the President.  In the 
Bush Administration, the JAGs opposed the OLC and its opinions 
regarding the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and the 
legality of proposed interrogation techniques.
180
  In the third year of 
the Obama Administration, an OLC opinion was reportedly
181
 
                                                          
converge on a conclusion of unconstitutionality, the President 
must make a decision about whether or not to comply with the 
provision.  That decision is necessarily specific to context, and it 
should be reached after careful weighing of the effect of 
compliance with the provision on the constitutional rights of 
affected individuals and on the executive branch's constitutional 
authority.  Also relevant is the likelihood that compliance or non-
compliance will permit judicial resolution of the issue.  That is, 
the President may base his decision to comply (or decline to 
comply) in part on a desire to afford the Supreme Court an 
opportunity to review the constitutional judgment of the 
legislative branch.  6.  The President has enhanced responsibility 
to resist unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon the 
constitutional powers of the Presidency.  Where the President 
believes that an enactment unconstitutionally limits his powers, 
he has the authority to defend his office and decline to abide by 
it, unless he is convinced that the Court would disagree with his 
assessment.  If the President does not challenge such provisions 
(i.e., by refusing to execute them), there often will be no occasion 
for judicial consideration of their constitutionality; a policy of 
consistent Presidential enforcement of statutes limiting his power 
thus would deny the Supreme Court the opportunity to review the 
limitations and thereby would allow for unconstitutional 
restrictions on the President's authority. 
 
Id. at 200–01.  
180 See supra Part III. 
181 See Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” The Office of Legal 
Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. FORUM 62 (2011); Charlie Savage & Thom Shanker, Scores of U.S. Strikes in 
Libya Followed Handoff to NATO, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2011, at A8; Bruce 
Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, Illegal war, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21Ackerman.html; Jack Balkin, 
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opposed by the State Department Legal Advisor over the 
applicability of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) regarding the 
U.S. Armed Forces’ participation in a multinational force to enforce a 
United Nations Resolution against Libya.  The OLC, backed by 
Attorney General Holder, advised President Obama that the WPR 
“hostilities” provision is applicable to the Commander-in-Chief 
power when “the military operations that the President anticipated 
ordering would be sufficiently extensive in ‘nature, scope, and 
duration’” to constitute a “war” requiring prior specific congressional 
approval under the Declaration of War Clause”.
182 
 In other words, 
the WPR 60-day rule is implicated by the “hostilities” provision but 
that, in turn, is defined by the Declaration of War Clause.  The OLC 
concluded that the proposed action did not activate the Declaration of 
War Clause, so the WPR Congressional prior approval provision was 
not invoked by the proposed deployment of troops.
183  
The State 
Department advised the President that the WPR was applicable to his 
decision to deploy troops, but “hostilities” is a factual and policy 
question, not a legal one; and, although “hostilities” occurs when 
American forces are in a situation in which they are fired upon, the 
fact that they are fired upon does not mean they are in “hostilities” 
                                                          
George W. Obama and the OLC, BALKINIZATION (June 18, 2011, 8:35 AM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/george-w-obama-and-olc.html; Jack 
Goldsmith, President Obama Rejected DOJ and DOD Advice, and Sided with 
Harold Koh, on War Powers Resolution, LAWFARE (June 17, 2011, 11:38 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/president-obama-rejected-doj-and-dod-
advice-and-sided-with-harold-koh-on-war-powers-resolution/; Michael Isikoff, On 
Libya, President Obama evaded rules on legal disputes, scholars say Decision to 
override Justice Department unit called 'disturbing' by one former legal adviser, 
NBC NEWS (June 21, 2011, 6:09 AM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43474045/ns/politics-white_house/t/libya-
president-obama-evaded-rules-legal-disputes-scholars-say/#.T-O_3JhnzIQ; Eric 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Libyan Legal Limbo: Why there’s nothing wrong with 
Obama ignoring some of his own legal advisors on Libya, SLATE (July 5, 2011, 
6:17 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/06/libyan_leg
al_limbo.html; Charles Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html?pagewanted=all. 
182 Caroline D. Krass, Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General: 
Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (Apr. 1, 2011) at 10, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf.  
183 Id. at 13.  
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that triggers the 60-day rule for withdrawal under the WPR.
184 
 The 
distinction between the two opinions was on the meaning of 
“hostilities” in which the State Department agreed that the proposed 
action constituted hostilities but not the type that required the 
activation of the 60-day rule while the OLC asserted that the 60-day 
rule is implicated only when the military action constitutes a war.  
President Obama accepted the view of the State Department Legal 
Advisor on the issue of the meaning and applicability of the WPR 
“hostilities” in his report to Congress.
185  
The result of both opinions 
                                                          
184 Testimony by State Department Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh, 
Libya and War Powers, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (June 28, 2011) 
(SH 112-89) at 14, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2011_hr/libya.pdf.  
Mr, Koh explained to Congress that in line with the historical view of the WPR and 
the Commander-in-Chief power the State Department’s position on the President’s 
deployment of troops is    
 
when U.S. forces engage in a limited military mission that 
involves limited exposure for U.S. troops and limited risk of 
serious escalation and employs limited military means, we are 
not in hostilities of the kind envisioned by the War Powers 
Resolution that was intended to trigger an automatic 60-day 
pullout.  
 
Id. at 9. 
185 UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA 25 (June 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/united-states-
activities-libya.html (President Barack Obama’s report to Congress regarding U.S. 
activities in Libya).  The President asserted in his report to Congress: 
 
The President is of the view that the current U.S. military 
operations in Libya are consistent with the War Powers 
Resolution and do not under that law require further 
congressional authorization, because U.S. military operations are 
distinct from the kind of “hostilities” contemplated by the 
Resolution’s 60-day termination provision.  U.S. forces are 
playing a constrained and supporting role in a multinational 
coalition, whose operations are both legitimated by and limited to 
the terms of a United Nations Security Council Resolution that 
authorizes the use of force solely to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under attack or threat of attack and to enforce a 
no-fly zone and an arms embargo.  U.S. operations do not 
involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile 
forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, 
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was accepted by the President; the dispute between the OLC and the 
State Department was over the legal reasoning each agency provided 
to the President regarding the conclusion of law and not the 
conclusion of law they both provided.  As John P. Elwood, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General for the OLC, testified in 2008, the role of 
the OLC is to advise the President of law and, in so doing, protect the 
rule of law within the Executive Branch; it is not the role of the OLC 
to prevail in policy disputes that might entail the law. 
 
It is true that OLC opinions ordinarily are controlling 
within the executive branch on questions of law. 
While OLC’s legal advice may inform its 
clients’ policy decisions, its legal advice rarely, if 
ever, compels the adoption of any particular policy.  
Rather, it remains up to the policymakers to decide 
whether, and how, to act. . . .  
. . . .  
But the purpose of OLC opinions is not to 
provide cover, even legal protection, for actors.  Its 
purpose is to help the President effect his duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.  So before he 
undertakes action, he routinely asks us for legal advice 
on matters that might be subject to dispute.  That’s the 
purpose of OLC opinions.
186
 
 
Elwood is correct that the OLC’s utility is not in prevailing over 
other agencies in the policy application of its legal determinations.  
Its utility lies in providing a nonbiased best view of the law 
assessment of the law and being prepared to tell the President “no” 
and providing that assessment to those who have to apply the law and 
policy and bear the responsibility of the results.  
                                                          
U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant 
chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by those factors. 
 
Id. at 25. 
186 Secret Law and the Threat to Democratic and Accountable 
Government: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6, 30 (2008) (statement of John P. Elwood, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel) [hereinafter Secret Law]. 
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Former Solicitor General Paul D. Clement, in a keynote 
address at Emory Law School, provided a useful discussion on the 
nature of intra-Executive Branch separation of powers and a 
description of various forms of statutory interpretation available 
within the Executive Branch.
187
  Although his keynote address 
focused on the Office of the Solicitor General, his comments on the 
various forms of agency decision making and the consequences of 
each is useful in examining the proper role of the OLC.  General 
Clement explained that there are differences within the field of policy 
and law; specifically, there are differences between (1) policymaking 
(political agenda preferences) and legal decision making (quasi-
judicial),
188
 (2) legal counseling  (providing advice on matters that 
most likely will not be litigated) and litigating (defending a policy in 
court),
189
 and (3) trial decisions (what cases are brought to court) and 
appellate decisions (what cases are appealed).
190
  The former in each 
grouping deals with policy considerations while the latter deals with 
quasi-judicial or objective legal determinations.  The nonpartisan, 
nonpolitical role of the OLC, like the Office of the Solicitor General, 
lies in the fact that it does not make decisions based on the political 
needs and desires of the Executive Branch per se.  Both offices make 
decisions based on neutral interpretation of the law.  To put the 
organizational system within the Justice Department and within the 
Executive Branch in perspective, the OLC determines what the law 
means and how the law governs the boundaries of executive 
policymaking power (Barr Doctrine, Neutral Expositor model), the 
Solicitor General determines whether the statute or policy once 
implemented can be reasonably defended before the bar of justice 
(Court Centered model), and the White House Counsel or the DOJ 
Office of Legal Policy determines if a proposed policy is in line with 
the political goals and objectives of the President (Independent 
Authority, Private Lawyer models).
191
  Institutionally, the first two 
                                                          
187 Paul D. Clement, The Intra-Executive Separation of Powers: Keynote 
Address, 2009 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, 59 EMORY L.J. 311 (2009). 
188 Id. at 315–18.  
189 Id. at 318–23.  
190 Id. at 323–24. 
191 See Darby Morrisroe, Co-Counsel to the President: Assessing the Bush 
White House Legal Policymaking Process (Sept. 6, 2009) (APSA 2009 Toronto 
Meeting Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450694. 
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agencies involve legal decision-making, and the last two agencies 
involve legal policymaking.  Put another way, the first two (the OLC 
and the Solicitor General) are more concerned with the rule of law 
and what the law requires while the last two (the White House 
General Counsel and the DOJ Office of Legal Policy) are concerned 
with political achievement within the law.  There are various 
strategies from which an agency empowered to interpret statutory or 
constitutional law can approach its role; in general, the two main 
approaches are quasi-judicial and policy-oriented.  The former 
approach functions like a court, with the primary focus on the 
meaning of the law rather than achieving a specific policy 
consequence of the interpretation.  The focus is on establishing and 
ruling on what the law provides.  The latter approach focuses on the 
achievement of a specific policy or political objective.  Neither 
approach is wrong per se.  The issue is which approach is correct 
based on the purpose of the agency. 
Where the Bush Administration OLC went wrong is that it 
produced opinions, the August 2002 Memo and CIA Interrogation 
Memo specifically, that abandoned the former role of quasi-judicial 
or objective legal determination for the latter role of achieving 
political objectives.
192
  The OLC (specifically John Yoo), in an effort 
to be seen as relevant and helpful to the political objectives of the 
Administration, abandoned its specific agency role of being the 
objective legal advisor to the Administration.
193
  The rule of law, 
which is above politics and policymaking, protects the system of 
government; the law governs the actions of politics.  The OLC is not 
a policy agency to be used as a political ideological weapon or shield 
for the White House.  Its role is quasi-judicial and it stands as the 
agency whose purpose is to apply and defend the law within the 
Executive Branch.  The failure to adhere to this role explains, in part, 
the torture memos.  
The distinction in the role and purpose of the OLC compared 
to other legal executive branch agencies is not trivial.  General 
Clement provided five reasons why the distinction between the role 
of the OLC and the Office of Solicitor General, and the political 
                                                          
192 See YOO, supra note 98; GOLDSMITH, supra note 100; Goldsmith, 
supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
193 YOO, supra note 98; GOLDSMITH, supra note 100; Goldsmith, supra 
note 104. 
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policymaking role of the White House and other agencies and offices 
within and outside of the Department of Justice are important.  These 
include: (1) efficient division of required skills and abilities to 
address overall operation within the Executive Branch, (2) the 
promotion of good inter-agency relationships, (3) the establishment 
of a framework for decision-making, (4) establishing a proper 
relationship with the White House, and (5) accountability for 
decisions when they are made.  It is the last two that are important for 
determining how the OLC produced the famed torture memos (from 
an agency perspective) and how the distinction between legal 
decision making and legal policy making were blurred within the 
Bush Administration.
194
  The White House and the White House 
Office of General Counsel, by definition, operate within the area of 
politics, policy and power.  The Attorney General, appointed by the 
President, is tasked with directing the Justice Department in line with 
the political views of the President.  To insulate the interpretation of 
the law from political determinations, the OLC and the Solicitor 
General are not invited into policymaking decisions within the White 
House.  The proper interaction between the White House Counsel, 
the OLC, and the Solicitor General should be when the White House 
needs a determination on what the law requires and if a proposed 
policy or statute can be defended before the bar of justice, not 
whether a policy should be implemented, supported, or opposed to 
achieve a specific political objective.  The OLC, after 9/11, confused 
this distinction and division of labor.  The OLC became the agency 
within the Bush Administration to justify policy rather than 
determine what the law required using its best, policy-outcome-
neutral, judgment.
195
  
As General Clement correctly explained, there is 
accountability when the political branches of the White House 
determine and implement a policy because the consequences can 
clearly be applied to those who made those determinations.  There is 
                                                          
194 The literature on how the Bush Administration organized legal 
policymaking is critical of both the failure of the OLC to remain policy-neutral and 
the overshadowing of the White House Counsel, the Justice Department, and other 
legal policy offices by the Office of Legal Counsel to the Vice President.  See, e.g., 
Morrisroe, supra note 191; James P. Pfiffner, The Contemporary Presidency: 
Decision Making in the Bush White House, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 363 (2009). 
195 GOLDSMITH, supra note 100, at 96–97 and accompanying text. 
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also clear accountability when those agencies responsible for holding 
the line in defining and protecting the rule of law within the 
Executive Branch focus exclusively on the rule of law and what the 
law rules.  The lines of accountability and judgment become blurred 
when the agency responsible for politics confuses what is politically 
desirable with what is legally required under the rule of law and, 
even worse, when the agency responsible for protecting the rule of 
law confuses legal analysis with achieving policy objectives.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
In discussing the purpose and history of the Office of the 
Attorney General,
196
 and later the Department of Justice and the 
OLC,
197
 General Bell concluded that all three serve the public 
interest by focusing on the observation that “[a]lthough our client is 
the government, in the end we serve a more important constituency: 
the American people.”
198
  As one observer of the history of the 
Attorney General commented, although  
                                                          
196 In drawing an analogy between the office of the U.S. Attorney General 
and the English Attorney General, Professor John Edwards observed the 
importance of the duty of the Attorney General to protect the public interest. 
 
A point that was made earlier—one that would be familiar to an 
English Attorney General—is that there is a residual 
responsibility for the public interest.  It is not, I think, without 
significance that historically, certainly for the past few centuries, 
the Attorney General of England has always been described as 
the guardian of the public interest.  He is both a member of the 
Administration and more . . . He is required to rise above the 
partisan obligations of being a member of the prevailing 
Administration . . . He has to have regard to the wider 
community.  It is a difficult tightrope he has to walk between 
these several obligations.  And it is only to the extent that he 
keeps them distinct, where there appears to be a conflict . . . . 
 
DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 119–20 (1980).  Former U.S. Attorney General Griffin 
Bell responded to this statement saying, “I was going to follow up on what John 
Edwards said.  I think our concept of the Attorney General is, or it should be, just 
what he describes as being the case in England.”  Id. at 121.  
197 Garrison, supra note 2. 
198 Bell, supra note 22, at 1069. 
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[a]ny cabinet officer is bound to act lawfully and not 
disobey the law . . . no other cabinet officer is the 
“custodian of the law” within the executive branch the 
way the Attorney General is . . . . That is, the office is 
created to provide within the executive branch a quasi-
judicial person—a member of the bar—who keeps the 
executive branch under law, and to whom the 
President and other executive officials can look for a 
uniform, authoritative pronouncement of the law, at 
least short of the courts.
199
  
 
The institutional purpose of the OLC is to provide the 
President, the White House General Counsel, the Attorney General, 
and the various agencies within the Executive Branch legal opinions 
on what the law is and if a proposed policy is in violation of the 
law.
200
  The OLC, as an agency within the Justice Department, has 
the exclusive authority to determine the meaning of the law and its 
determinations are determinative and authoritative on all Executive 
Branch agencies with one exception—the Office of Solicitor 
General.
201
  The power of the OLC to interpret the law and its 
meaning regarding Executive Branch policymaking is significant 
(again, as an institutional matter) because “an agency’s approach to 
statutory interpretation is in part a function of the policymaking form 
through which it acts.”
202
  In other words, how the OLC perceived its 
                                                          
199 MEADOR, supra note 196, at 118. 
200 Secret Law, supra note 186, at 111. 
201 Nancy Kassop, The View from the President, in MAKING POLICY, 
MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 72 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes 
eds., 2004); Mary Anne Borrelli, Karen Hult & Nancy Kassop, The White House 
Counsel’s Office, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 561, 570 (2001); CORNELL W. 
CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING 
OF LEGAL POLICY (1992); Nelson Lund, Guardians of the Presidency: The Office of 
the Counsel to the President and the Office of Legal Counsel, in GOVERNMENT 
LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY 209 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 
1995); Michael Strine, Counsels to the President: The Rise of Organizational 
Competition, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY 257 
(Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995). 
202 Kevin M. Stack, Agency Statutory Interpretation and Policymaking 
Form, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 225, 226 (2009). 
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function within the policymaking process during the first two years 
after the events of 9/11 governed how it produced its memos.  
Although it is a truism that the Attorney General and the Assistant 
Attorney General for the OLC are political appointees and as such 
should reflect the political and legal philosophy of the President who 
appoints them, both have a higher obligation to interpret the law 
without regard for the political objectives of the President.  To be 
sure, there are other branches within the Executive Branch that 
support and implement purely political objectives of the President.  
The point is that the OLC is not one of them.  The OLC, exercising 
the power of the Attorney General, is tasked with providing the best, 
nonpolitical view of the law to the President.  In doing so, the OLC 
assists the President in making sure that the laws are faithfully 
executed.  It is this purpose, history, and tradition that supports, 
justifies, and legitimates the quasi-judicial power that rests in the 
hands of the OLC, which originate in the Article II power of the 
President.  
 
 
